Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 4 Issue 4 - October 1962

Article 5

10-1962

The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in Defamation
Arno C. Becht

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Arno C. Becht, The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 Vanderbilt Law Review 1127
(1962)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in
Defamation
A1no C. Becht*
Should executive officers have an absolute privilege to commit defamation? This is ProfessorBecht's inquiry as he traces the evolution and
application of this privilege from its origin in England through its
development in American state and federal courts. After balancing the
factors for and against absolute immunity, the writer reaches the conclusion that officials should be reduced to a qualified privilege in
defamation.

In the last three quarters of a century the American federal courts have
established the rule that executive officers have an absolute privilege to
commit defamation-that is, that they can avoid liability for their statements
even when they publish them maliciously. The development, which includes two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 1 has
stimulated much discussion. 2 In this article I propose to examine in Part 1
the origin of the doctrine in England, and, in Part 2, its growth in the
American federal courts. Part 3 is a survey of the American state courts and
3
Part 4 contains a critique of the rule.
* Madill Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.
1. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
These cases produced many law review notes and comments. A partial list follows:
Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. RtEv. 228 (1960); Note, 38 TExAs L. REV. 120 (1959); Note,
21 U. Prrr. L. RiEV. 41 (1959); 9 DE PAUL L. Rlv. 115 (1959); 6 How. L.J. 98
(1960); 20 MD. L. REv. 368 (1960); 58 Micri. L. REv. 295 (1959); 34 ST. JOHN's
L. REv. 168 (1959); 13 Vmr. L. REv. 590 (1960).
2. See Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MicH. L. R_'v. 201 (1956);
Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 303 (1959); Veeder,

Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10 CoLum.

L. REv. 131, at 140-146 (1910); Note, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69
H v. L. REv. 875, 917-24 (1956); Note, Defamation Immunity for Executive Officers,
20 U. Ciu. L. REv. 677 (1953). These are all before the Supreme Court cases cited in
note I supra. For discussion since those cases see Green, The Right to Communicate,
35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 903 (1960); Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation

Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARv. L. REv. 44 (1960).

The problem is discussed in the following textbooks: FLEMING, TORTS 524-26 (2d ed.
1961); 1 HAPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 5.23, at 429 (1956); 2 id. § 29.10, at 1644-45;
Moms, ToRTs 297-98 (1953); PRossEm, TORTS § 95, at 612-13 (2d ed. 1955);
WInIEtLD, TORT § 86, at 337 (6th ed. 1954). See also Annot., 53 A.L.R. 1526 (1928);
Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1340 (1941).
3. I have had to save space by omitting the substance of the defamations, and I
have also more or less ignored the questions of the scope of official duties, and the
relevance requirement, because I am chiefly concerned with the question whether the
privilege ought to exist at all.
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I. THE ENGLISH CASES
Sutton v. Johnstone,4 decided in 1786, was not a defamation case but it
raised the question of privilege and the reasoning developed in it is relevant
even now. The plaintiff had been acquitted by a court-martial on a charge
of disobedience of naval orders, and sued the Commodore of the Fleet in
the Exchequer for malicious prosecution. The defendant did not use the
phrase "absolute privilege" but in effect that was his defense. Baron Eyre,
speaking for the court and refusing to arrest a judgment for the plaintiff,
said: "The Court never had a difficulty upon this part of the case."5 After
saying that he thought the privilege of judges and jurors not in point, he
continued:
The commander in chief of a squadron of ships of war is in the condition
of every other subject of this country, who, being put in authority, has
responsibility annexed to his situation.
The propositions, which attempt to establish a distinction for him, are

dangerously loose and indefinite.... .f it be meant that a commander in
chief has a privilege to bring a subordinate officer to a court-martial for an

offense which he knows him to be innocent of, under colour of his power,
or of a duty of his situation to bring forward inquiries into the conduct of

6
his officers, the proposition is too monstrous to be debated.

Admitting that power ought sometimes to be without bounds,
... .it is impossible to state a case where it is necessary that it should

be abused; and it is the felicity of those who live under a free constitution of
Government, that it is7 equally impossible to state a case where it can be
abused with impunity.

In the Exchequer Chamber, Lords Mansfield and Loughborough reversed
the case, holding that there was probable cause; they also concurred in
other reasons which they admitted were "not necessary to the judgment,"8
but which at least obliquely contradicted Baron Eyre on the point he had
found easy. Finding no authority and no helpful analogy, they asserted that
by statute a man charged with a naval offense could only be tried by courtmartial and that a commander who ordered a trial without probable cause
could only be tried by a similar tribunal. Moreover, the country's safety
depended upon discipline in the fleet; only a court-martial could appreciate
the pressures on a commander and the need for obedience. Finally, if the
action were allowed, a suit at common law would follow every acquittal at
a court-martial, thereby increasing the already harmful consequences of
4. 1 T.R. 493, 99 Eng. Rep. 1215 (1786).
5. Id. at 503, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1221.

6. Ibid.

7. Id. at 504, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1221.
8. Id. at 550, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1246.
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politics in the navy.9 Their judgment was affirmed in the House of Lords,
but the opinions there are not reported.' 0

The difference between the judges forced them to state evaluations which
are still fundamental to the question of absolute privilege. Baron Eyre was

troubled by the scope of the principle ("dangerously loose and indefinite")
and the enormity of a malicious wrong without a remedy ("too monstrous
to be debated"), and in linking his denial of the privilege to a "free consti-

tution of government" he had his eye on the individual standing against a
centralized executive. Mansfield and Loughborough, on the other hand,

feared partly for the officer, who ought not to be tried except by a tribunal
that can understand his predicament, and partly for the service, which

might be disrupted by the prospect of common law liability.
The next development introduced a rule of quite a different order which

nevertheless has influenced the development of absolute executive privilege
in England. In three cases within four years the courts determined that
some kinds of executive statements could not be proved in court, giving
various justifications which in the end amount to protecting official pro-

ceedings against disclosure.'1 In the third of the cases, Home v. Lord
Bentinck,12 the court seems to have given the rule a broad scope, for it
excluded the minutes of a military court of inquiry which had passed upon
the conduct of an officer in commercial matters not connected with his
military service. The privilege in these cases is testimonial and not substan9. Summarizing id. at 548-50, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1245-46.
10. See id. at 784, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1377 (1787); 1 Brown 76, 1 Eng. Rep. 427
(1787).
11. In Wyatt v. Gore, Holt 299, 171 Eng. Rep. 250 (C.P. Nisi Prius 1816), an
action, inter alia, for libel, against the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, the
attorney general of the province was not allowed to testify to what the defendant had
said to him about the plaintiff. Gibbs, C. J., thought that the communications were
"confidential," and that "no office of this kind could be executed with safety," if they
could be revealed. Id. at 302, 171 Eng. Rep. at 251. The plaintiff recovered judgment
for a libel contained in a pamphlet which the defendant delivered to the attorney
general, on the ground that this act was not "for any official purpose, instruction, or
advice ..
" Id. at 305, 171 Eng. Rep. at 252. This, of course, is consistent with an
absolute privilege for publications within the scope of an official's duties. But I cannot
see that the issue of substantive privilege was raised.
In Anderson v. Hamilton, 2 Br. & B. 156 n.b., 129 Eng. Rep. 917 (1816), an action
for false imprisonment against the Governor of Heligoland, Lord Ellenborough excluded
a letter of the secretary of state for the colonial department, saying: "I do not like
breaking in upon this correspondence; it might be pregnant with a thousand facts of
the utmost consequence respecting the state of the government, the connection of
parties, the state of politics, and the suspicion of foreign powers with whom we may
be in alliance." Id. at 156 n.b, 129 Eng. Rep. at 918.
12. 2 Br. & B. 130, 129 Eng. Rep. 907 (1820). The action was for libel. Dallas,
0.J., relied upon the rule protecting the names of informers from disclosure, and upon
the Wyatt case, concluding that "upon the broad principle of state policy and public
convenience," (Id. at 164, 129 Eng. Rep. at 921), the evidence was correctly excluded, and affirming a directed verdict for the defendant.
The history of the use of the testimonial privilege in defamation is more completely
traced to 8 WIGMoRE, EvmENcE: § 2378 n.1 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
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tive as in the Sutton case,1 3 but when it applies it protects the official, for
better or worse, as effectually as a substantive privilege by preventing proof
of the statement. 14
After these cases nearly fifty years elapsed, with a single nisi prius case
which contradicted all that had been decided before.15 The first of the
modem cases, Dawkins v. Lord Paulet,16 arose in the Queen's Bench in
1869. A captain in the Coldstream Guards demanded a court of inquiry
into his treatment by the defendant, and the defendant forwarded the letter
to the Adjutant-General of the Army with an enclosure of his own, accusing
the plaintiff of military incompetence. Judge Mellor observed that Mr.
Justice Hayes had heard the argument and approved of his judgment, but
had since died. He then stated a variety of reasons for giving judgment
for the defendant, and among them absolute privilege, supporting it by
analogy to the judicial privilege, and by relying upon the opinions of
Mansfield and Loughborough in the Sutton case, which, though admitting
they were not binding, he thought entitled to weight. He also adverted
to the absolute privilege of legislators and to an absolute privilege of
ministers in advising the Crown. Judge Lush also held for the defendant,
but whether he concurred only in Mellor's final reason, that the defendant's
sole remedy was in a military tribunal under the articles of war, or also
agreed with the absolute privilege, is more than I can be sure of. Chief
13. For this distinction see 8 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 12, §§ 2367, 2368; the
latter section says "the testimonial and the tortious privileges should be strictly distinguished." Id. § 2368, at 747.
14. See id. § 2378.
15. Dickson v. Earl of Wilton, 1 F. & F. 419, 175 Eng. Rep. 790 (Nisi Prius 1859).
The plaintiff, an army officer, sued the defendant, the commanding officer of a regiment,
for libel and slander, basing his case on two letters which the defendant wrote to his
superior for the information of the Secretary of War, and upon words spoken to a
Member of Parliament. Lord Campbell compelled a clerk of the war office to produce
one of the letters and in his instructions to the jury limited the defendant to a qualified
privilege. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. Since the charge against the plaintiff
was of irregularity in handling the financial affairs of his regiment-more nearly a matter
of military discipline than the commercial misconduct charged in the Home case-this
case is indistinguishable from the others on the testimonial privilege and seems to agree
more nearly with Baron Eyre than with the Court of Exchequer Chamber on the issue
of substantive privilege. It is possible that the defendant lost an absolute privilege by
pleading only not guilty and truth, or because his counsel (the Attorney General) only
asked for an absolute privilege after a qualified one had been given in the charge, but
the court did not say so. I cannot believe in these explanations. In 8 WiGMoE,
op. cit supra note 12, § 2378 n.1, this case is said to be "practically repudiated" on
the issue of testimonial privilege.
I omit Keighly v. Bell, 4 F. & F. 763, 176 Eng. Rep. 781 (C.P. 1866) in which an
army captain sued a military superior for false imprisonment and for a libel in a letter
which the defendant sent to a civil court in a suit by the government against the plaintiff. Willes, J., held that there was no evidence of bad motive to support either cause of
action. In a colloquy with counsel he hinted at an absolute privilege for the libel, but
it was the judicial and not the executive privilege that he referred to.
16. L.R. 5 Q.B. 94, 21 L.T.R. (N.S.) 584 (1869).
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Justice Cockburn, in a strong dissent, attacked the various grounds for the

privilege, and said:
But whatever may be the right view of this matter with reference to
considerations of policy, a grave question appears to me to present itself as
to how far a court of law is warranted, in the absence of positive law or
previous decision, in refusing redress in a case of admitted wrong and in
which the right of action would otherwise be undoubted, simply because on
grounds of public convenience the action as between the particular parties
ought not to be allowed. The case of judges and jurymen seems to me, I
17
must say, very remote.

He observed that Lord Mansfield had apparently not found the judicial
privilege a helpful analogy, and expressed the gravest doubts whether that
privilege itself could be justified except by precedent. This case is an
authority of doubtful strength for the privilege when one recalls the doubts
about Judge Lush's opinion and that the Chief Justice dissented. In a
subsequent case the Privy Council, though it thought the rule of the
Dawkins case might apply to other situations, refused to apply it to the

case before it.18
Dawkins appeared as a plaintiff again in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby,19 in

which he sued his superior officer for written and oral testimony (asserting
that the plaintiff was unfit to command) at a military court of inquiry. The
Court of Queen's Bench affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant, giving
him the benefit of the judicial privilege; it also relied upon the testimonial
privilege, citing Home v. Bentincl' 20 and argued that only a military tribunal
should decide such issues. It is evident that this case is no authority for
an executive privilege; the House of Lords, in affirming, also relied upon
17. Id. at 110, 21 L.T.R. (N.S.) at 591.
I omit Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 4 F. & F. 806, 176 Eng. Rep. 800 (1866), although Chief Justice Cockburn said that it was in conflict with his views, because it
was not a defamation case. Besides, it is not clear to me whether it rests on an absolute privilege or on the ground that the military courts were the exclusive tribunals for
the issues raised. My doubts about the grounds for Judge Lush's decision in the
Paulet case arise from the same ambiguity. See the last paragraph of his opinion,
L.R. 5 Q.B. at 122, 21 L.T.R. (N.S.) at 595.
18. Hart v. Gumpach, L.R. 4 P.C. 439 (1872). This case arose between English
subjects in China, where the defendant was an official of the Chinese government under
direction of a Chinese board of ministers. The action, brought in an English court in
China, was for libel in a communication by the defendant to the board, and the court
denied an absolute privilege on the negative grounds that there were not enough facts
pleaded to establish it and that there was no showing what privilege might be given
by Chinese law. It doubted that there would be an absolute privilege under English
law. A verdict for the plaintiff was reversed for misdirection on the issue of qualified
privilege and the court added that if the evidence were the same on a new trial there
should be a directed verdict for the defendant, as the evidence of malice was insufficient.
19. L.R. 8 Q.B. 255 (1873). 8 WiGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 12, § 2378 n.1, contains a comment on the confusion of the substantive and testimonial privileges in this

case.
20. See note 12 supra.
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the judicial, not the executive, privilege 21
Through the Dawkins cases it seems fair to say that the English courts
were not firmly committed either way on the issue of absolute privilege. If
this is so, the next two cases probably balance each other. Grant v. Secretary of State for India22 was an action, inter alia, for libel, based on the
publication in the Indian Gazette of a government order removing the
plaintiff, a military officer, to the pension list. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint perhaps on the ground that the defendant had an
absolute privilege like the one in the Paulet case and because neither the
removal nor the publication of the fact was within the court's competence. 23
On the other hand Royal Aquarium & Summer & Winter Garden Society,
Ltd., v. Parkinson,24 denied an absolute privilege to a member of the
London County Council for slander committed at an official meeting. The
defendant, however, seems to have claimed only the judicial privilege.25
On this state of the precedents, Chattertonv. Secretary of State for India
in Council26 came to the Court of Appeal in 1895. A question was asked in
the House of Commons about the official treatment of the plaintiff, a captain
in the Indian Staff Corps. The defendant, in order to prepare the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India to answer, stated to him that the military
and civil authorities in India, in a dispatch, recommended the plaintiff's
removal because retaining him "on the effective list was in every way most
undesirable." 7 The plaintiff, in an action for libel, alleged that the defendant published the statement, knowing it to be false and that the dispatch
did not contain such a statement, intending to prevent Parliament from
investigating and causing the under-secretary to publish it to the House
and in the press. The lower judges concurred in dismissing the action as
vexatious and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
Lord Esher, M.R., referred to Lord Ellenborough, and almost certainly
to his opinion in Anderson v. Hamilton;28 that case is on the testimonial
privilege and Lord Ellenborough was concerned in it for the protection
of state secrets, but Lord Esher said that the reason for the rule was that
an officer would lose his freedom of action to the public loss if he were
21. L.R. 7 H.L. 744 (1875).
22. L.R. 2 C.P.D. 445 (1877).
23. The court pointed out that since the plaintiff had not pleaded express malice
and could only connect the defendant with the publication by assuming that the
Gazette was an official organ, it could put the case on a narrower ground, but chose
to rest on the broader propositions in order to save the plaintiff expense. But the court's
repeated statements that there was no allegation of express malice make the case difflcult to interpret, and, to my mind, reduce it to a most questionable authority, if it is
one at all, for absolute privilege.
24. [18921 1 Q.B. 431 (C.A.).
25. I doubt from the strength of the language in the opinions, that the defendant
would have improved his chances by asking for the legislative or executive privileges.
26. [1895] 2 Q.B. 189 (C.A.).
27. Id. at 189 (the quoted words are from the plaintiff's statement of claim).
28. Note 11 supra. He did not cite the case but the reference seems clear.
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obliged to testify and stand a jury trial upon such issues, a policy appropriate to the substantive and not the testimonial privilege. This is a thorough
confusion of the testimonial and substantive privileges. He added that the
law:
seems to me to be accurately summed up in Fraser on the Law of Libel and
Slander, p. 95, where he says, after stating that no action lies in respect of a
defamatory statement in a report made in the course of military or naval duty,
"For reasons of public policy the same protection would, no doubt, be given
to anything in the nature of an act of state, e.g., to every communication
relating to state matters made by one minister to another, or to the Crown."
I adopt that paragraph as stating the law correctly. In my opinion, the statement of which the plaintiff complains, being a communication relating to 2 a9
absolutely privileged.
state matter made by one state official to another, was
positions. He said
Lord Justice Kay followed Lord Esher in both of his
3 0 and Home v. Lord
Hamilton,
v.
Anderson
were
authorities
closest
that the
Bentinck,3 ' both of which, in his opinion, though they were rulings on the
evidence, compelled the conclusion that the communication was absolutely
privileged. He agreed that Lord Esher's quotation from Fraser accurately
stated the law, though no case was cited as authority for the doctrine. Lord
Justice Smith also relied upon the Anderson and Home cases, together with
Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 32 all of which he interpreted as giving an absolute
privilege. He stated as a second ground that the libel was a state document
which, according to the cases, a lower court should not permit in evidence
even if no objection were made; this seems to be no more than a statement
of the rule in the Anderson and Home cases.
It is extraordinary that one justice of the Court of Appeal should adopt
a text-book statement without noticing the want of authority for it, and
that another should call attention to the defect while also adopting the
passage. It is equally extraordinary and more to the point that the judges
33
should produce a fusion of the substantive and testimonial privileges
without noticing the difference between them. The confusion is apparent,
because there is no point in speaking of an "absolute privilege" if the
testimonial privilege is meant. I am not qualified to suggest what the scope
of the testimonial privilege should be; but it seems clear that the policy
behind it, even if it extends beyond diplomatic affairs and military security
to internal matters,3 4 must be quite different from that behind a rule
29. Id. at 191-92.
30. Note 11 supra.
31. Note 12 supra.
32. Note 19 supra. This case also contains a reference to the testimonial privilege.
See the text at note 20 supra.
33. See 8 WIcNORE, op. cit. supra note 12, § 2368, at 747 and § 2378 for the confusion between the privileges and the necessity for distinguishing them.
34. The questions of the scope of the testimonial privilege and its administration are
complex and difficult. See 8 WIGIAOnE, op. cit. supra note 12, §§ 2378, 2379; Mc-
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intended to protect officials from suits for malicious torts; and it would
therefore be an amazing stroke of luck if the proper ranges of the two
rules should turn out to be the same. It is odd, moreover, that none of the
judges mentioned the Paulet case, which was more nearly in point than
any other. Thus, this case, which might have settled the precedents,
actually introduced confusion, while at the same time it appears to be a
rather broad declaration in favor of absolute executive privilege.
Subsequent decisions do not seem to clarify the rule or extend it.3s In
Isaacs & Sons, Ltd., v. Cook,36 Roche, J., relying upon the authority of
Fraser cited by Lord Esher in the Chatterton case, held that the absolute
privilege protected an official report by the High Commissioner to the
Prime Minister of Australia, and its incidental publication to various lower
officials, even though it was about a commercial matter.3 7 It is significant
that, while he noted a distinction between the testimonial and the substantive privileges, he expressly adopted Lord Justice Kay's treatment of these
"as similar questions, each throwing light upon the other,"38 in the Chatterton case. Aside from an inconclusive case in the Privy Council,39 there is
one other decision that is difficult to assess, though it does not show any
inclination on the part of the Court of Appeal to extend absolute privilege.40
The defendant, a general prosecutor for the Czech government in exile,
sent to the military office of the president of that government documents
and a summary which defamed the plaintiff, Czech acting minister in
Egypt. The communication occurred in England and the court for that
reason applied English law and held that there was no reason for giving an
absolute privilege. It distinguished the Paulet case on the ground that the
defendant there acted within the scope of his duties "with reference to a
court of inquiry,"41 while the communication before it could not be justified
Coimocx,

EvmENcE §§ 143-147 (1954). As these problems are not germane to the
question of substantive privilege, I have made no attempt to follow them up, but have
only tried to show that the testimonial privilege contributed to the result in the Chatter-

ton case.

35. Adam v. Ward, [1917] A.C. 309 (H.L.) might have produced interesting authority, especially on the issue of press releases, but the defendant apparently did not claim
an absolute privilege, and the court, at any rate, did not consider it.
36. [1925] 2 K.B. 391.

37. It commented on the sale of fruit where the plaintiffs conducted some of their
business and contrasted it unfavorably with another place in London.
38. [1925] 2 K.B. at 399. This continues what seems to me a dangerous confusion.
39. O'Connor v. Waldron, [1935] A.C. 76 (P.C. 1934). The defendant, a commissioner appointed under the Combines Investigation Act, apparently claimed the
judicial privilege for a statement defaming the plaintiff. The court relied on the
Royal Aquarium case (text at notes 24 & 25 supra) in denying the privilege, and
seems to have had only the judicial privilege in mind, which, in my opinion, limits the
following broad statement: "This [a qualified privilege] is the measure of protection
given to other administrative officers exercising similar duties, and their Lordships
know of no legal principle which affords any further or better protection." Id. at 83.

40. Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink, [1947] 1 K.B. 1 (C.A. 1946).
41. Id. at 11.
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in that way as there was no court in which the plaintiff could have been
42
tried.
The mixture of military and civil cases, the confusion of the testimonial
and the substantive privileges, and the other peculiarities of its development,
make it very difficult to state what the law of England now is, and much
harder to attempt a prediction of what it will be. Gray, whose treatment
of the English cases has been helpful, thinks that there is now no special
rule for the military cases, 43 that absolute privilege is limited in England
to communications among cabinet ministers and still higher officials, and
that the Chatterton case, which he says asserted a wider rule, has been so
limited by later decisions as to make it "all but meaningless." 44 Though I
share his dislike for the privilege, I am not so sure about the future of the
Chatterton case. However queer its grounds, it remains a possible source
of expansion, and there is no reason why a future decision might not adopt
its result or extend it, while putting it on the ground of the substantive
privilege.45 It is clear at any rate that the privilege in England has had no
such scope as the American federal courts have given it.
II. Tim AmmacN FEDmiAL CAsEs
The review of the federal cases which follows is a story that has often
been told.46 Yet, an account of it is important in a discussion of the absolute
executive privilege, among other reasons for the purpose of comparison
with the English and the American state cases; and besides, the development of the privilege is an intrinsically interesting example of judicial process. These reasons, perhaps, justify yet another re-telling.
A. TrmouGH T=E Spalding CASE (1896)

Baron Eyre's denial of absolute privilege when it was suggested to him
in the Sutton case, was matched by early decisions of the United States
42. The court held that there was no evidence of malice to defeat a qualified privilege. It distinguished Hart v. Gumpach, supra note 18, on the ground that the acts
in that case happened in China.
43. Gray, supra note 2, at 328 & n.155.
44. Id. at 328.
45. Gray also suggests that the proper ground for the Chatterton case would be the
testimonial privilege. Ibid. I have one misgiving about this, which is, I think, independent of the question how far the testimonial privilege ought to extend. The Secretary
of State for India in the Chatterton case was allowed to state that the dispatch defamed
the plaintiff in a particular way, and then to suppress the dispatch itself. I am suspicious

of a rule that allows an official to say what is in a secret document while he conceals
the document from scrutiny by a court. If the protection of the public interest did not
require suppression of the secretary's statement how could it require suppression of the
dispatch? At least, the uses to which an unscrupulous official might put such a rule
make me nervous.

46. Nearly all the notes and comments in note 1 supra give an account of the development in one way or another.
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Supreme Court which also met it with hostility. An 1845 case 47 even denied
the absolute judicial privilege in dicta and, as late as 1868, Randall v.
Brigham,48 which is not strictly in point because it was not a libel case,
contained broadly significant language giving a judge only a qualified privilege, though the defense succeeded nevertheless. Shortly afterward, in
Bradley v. Fisher,49 again not a defamation case, the language of the Randall
case was explained away, and the absolute privilege of judges was officially
established. It was perhaps a warning for the future that the case going
furthest was in a federal trial court which gave the testimonial privilege to
a federal appraiser of merchandise.5 0
With this background the outlook for absolute executive privilege was
not promising, but it was nevertheless accepted and given a broad statement
in Spalding v. Vilas,5 ' in 1896. The plaintiff, a lawyer, had represented
many postmasters in securing adjustments of their compensation, and had
powers of attorney to receive the drafts for adjusted payments. The defendant, the Postmaster General, caused payment drafts to be sent directly
to about 4,000 claimants with letters stating that an attorney's services were
not necessary and that powers of attorney to receive payment were void
under federal statutes, copies of which were attached. Though the action
may not have been technically for libel, the plaintiff alleged that he was
made to appear a "common swindler,"52 and that there was express malice.
The court held that the defendant acted within the scope of his duties
and was not liable even if he had express malice, referring to the Paulet
and Rokeby cases and relying chiefly on the analogy to the judicial privilege.
The court went no further than to give the privilege to "heads of Executive
Departments,"53 but in the hands of such an officer it included "action
having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law
to his control or supervision." 54 The following passage states the justification for the decision:
47. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845). The court seems to have had
the privilege of pleadings expressly in its mind, but the opinion contains a very broad
denial of all absolute privileges.
48. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). The language may be weakened by the court's
use of the word "perhaps."
49. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
50. Gardner v. Anderson, 9 Fed. Cas. 1158 (No. 5220) (C.C.D. Md. 1876). The
defendant had defamed the plaintiff, one of his clerks, in a letter to the Secretary of
the Treasury. The court declined to compel attendance by the secretary or production
of the letter. My liking for the case is not increased by the fact that someone had
anticipated the testimonial privilege by removing the office copy of the letter from the
files. Above all it is odd that this was the circuit court in Maryland, where the supreme
court has since been probably the most hostile of the state courts to the substantive
privilege. See the text at notes 133-37 infra.
51. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
52. Id. at 486.
53. Id. at 498.
54. Ibid.
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In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department,
keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time,
become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously
cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted

to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such
restraint. He may have legal authority to act, but he may have such large
discretion in the premises that it will not always be his absolute duty to
exercise the authority with which he is invested. But if he acts, having
authority, his conduct cannot be made the foundation of a suit against him
personally for damages, even if the circumstances show that he is not disagreeably impressed by the fact that his action injuriously affects the claims
of particular individuals.55

This case was the basis for the development which quickly followed.
B. Tim COURT OF APPEALs OF THE Dismrcr OF COLUMBIA,
THROuGHri
Mellon CAsE, (1927)
The Supreme Court, when it rendered its decision in the Spalding case,
had moved in half a century from denying the absolute privilege to judges
to granting it to a cabinet member. It did not pass upon the question
again until 1959.56 In the meantime most of the responsibility for the doctrine fell upon the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, which
decided all the federal defamation cases until 1933 and all but two (in
federal trial courts) until 1948.57 No doubt the concentration of federal
officials in Washington accounts for the predominance of this court, and it
may be that by limiting this discussion to defamation I make its influence
seem more than it actually was, for questions of absolute privilege arise
also in other torts.58 But the fact remains that in the hands of this court
the doctrine expanded until the case law had a vastly different form when
the Supreme Court returned to it again.
The first crucial step was extending the doctrine to officials below
cabinet rank, and this was taken in the first decision after the Spalding
case, De Arnaud v. Ainsworth,59 in which the court gave the privilege to
the chief of the record and pension office of the War Department for an
official report to the Secretary of War. It contended that, as the Secretary
could not do all the work of the Department himself, the privilege had to
55. Id. at 498-99.
56. See note 1 supra. I pass over Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165 (1913), for the
defendants in that case, though they might have been able to claim an executive privilege, actually claimed the judicial privilege and the case rests on that ground.
57. This will appear in the ensuing discussion. Gray, supra note 2, at 337 has
called attention to the activity of the court of appeals.
58. But Gray says that the court was active in spreading the privilege to other torts
as well. Ibid.
59. 24 App. D.C. 167 (1904), error dismissed, 199 U.S. 616 (1905).
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reach lower officials, and that it was"not the particular position of the party
making the report or communication that entitles it to absolute privilege
so much as the occasion of making it.. ... 60 The shift from "position" to
"occasion" did the work. The influence of the English cases was also felt,
as it had been in the Spalding case. The court referred to the Home, the
Paulet, and the Rokeby cases, and found the Chatterton case, which it
surmised was not available to the Supreme Court in the Spalding case, a
closer analogy than any of the others. It added:
It would seem to be clear, therefore, that the principle of absolute privilege
is unquestionably established by the English authorities, as applicable to a
case like the present; and that principle is not less clearly and fully established in this jurisdiction by the case of Spalding v. Vilas, to which we have
referred. 61
The court followed its own case in giving the privilege to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for communications to his superior, the Secretary
of the Interior, in Farr v. Valentine.62 The next case, National Disabled
Soldiers' League v. Haan,63 denied the privilege to the manager of a district
office of the Veteran's Bureau, for sending a copy of a defamatory letter
written to his superior, to a Senator who had written to him about the
matter; while the case indicates that there are limits to the privilege, it is
64
not very helpful in showing what they are.
The second step, extending the zone of privileged communications to a
wider audience, began with Mellon v. Brewer.65 The plaintiff, in various
official capacities, had investigated charges of fraud in the handling of
United States bonds, and the defendant, Secretary of the Treasury, sent a
letter to the President defending his Department against the charges,
which had received a good deal of publicity, partly through the plaintiff.
60. Id. at 181.
61. Id. at 184. There might be a question whether the reliance upon English cases,
especially the Home and Chatterton cases, did not infect the American cases with the
confusion between the testimonial and substantive privileges. But traces of the testimonial privilege are very rare in the American defamation cases, as the discussion will
show, and aside from this passage in the De Arnaud case the confusion does not seem
to have had any influence, if indeed it had any there.
62. 38 App. D.C. 413 (1912).
63. 4 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1925). I am not sure that the defendant even claimed an
absolute privilege. There was a trial at which both parties produced evidence, followed
by a directed verdict for the defendant, which the court of appeals afirmed on the
ground that there was a qualified privilege but the plaintiff had no evidence of express
malice.
64. Perhaps because the facts did not require the drawing of a very precise line. The
passage dealing with absolute privilege is very brief and said that if the case had been
based on the letter to the defendant's superior, "a different issue would have been
presented." Id. at 441. Under the De Arnaud and Farr cases it seems that the original
letter should have had an absolute privilege. The plaintiff did not attempt to recover
for anything but the publication to the senator.
65. 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 530 (1927).
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The letter called the charges unfounded and questioned the plaintiff's good
faith ("He certainly had no interest in the truth, if it were inconsistent with
the charges upon which his employment depended."66 ). The court was
well within the Spalding case in holding that the letter to the President was
absolutely privileged even if the President had not requested it, and it also
seems clear that the remarks about the plaintiff were not, under the circumstances, irrelevant. The novel point was that the letter had been published
in newspapers; the defendant met this with the contention that it had been
published in the CongressionalRecord before it appeared in newspapers.
The court held the publication absolutely privileged, 67 saying:
Certainly we would not be justified in assuming that the head of a department
of the government and member of the Cabinet would make public such a
communication or report in advance of its receipt by the President, or without
the approval of the President. And, since publication of this official communication or report by the President would not have formed the basis of an
action for libel, we are unable to perceive why its publication 68under the
presumed direction of the President could have any other effect.

As the case arose upon a demurrer to the declaration, this presumption of
presidential authority seems both broad and questionable, but it is principally upon such grounds that the rule privileging press publication begins
69
in the federal system.
C. THE FEDERAL CouRTs TimouGH Tm Glass CASE (1940)
In the period from 1927 until 1940 there was expansion and consolidation

of the positions already taken, and the doctrine spread slightly into the
66. Id. at 170.
67. The precedent on the point was very slender. In the Spalding case the publication was by letter to 4,000 claimants and was as narrow as possible, for the defendant
could hardly have been asked to confine his mailing list to the plaintiff's clients, and
might have appeared malicious if he had. In the De Arnaud case the defendant's report
had been published as part of a Senate committee report and the defendant had
handed a copy of this report to a man who made inquiries about the plaintiff. (This
man, named Hill, is not identified in the opinion. I think the court may have suspected
that he was a decoy.) The court held that the Senate committee report itself was
privileged and that the privilege extended to those who circulated it. The Haan case,
note 63 supra, on the other hand, allowed only a qualified privilege for a copy sent to
a single senator.
68. 18 F.2d at 172.
69. The plaintiff also argued that it could be inferred from concessions in the briefs
and allegations in the declaration that copies of the letter were given to the newspapers
before its publication in the Congressional Record. The court replied: "Under the
views already expressed, we deem it unnecessary to determine this question. But see
De Arnaud v. Ainsworth .... " (Id. at 172), and gave a local citation to the passage
summarized from the De Arnaud case, note 67 supra. The "views already expressed"
probably consist of the tenuous presumption about the President's approval, while the
passage in the De Arnaud case does not deal with executive privilege, but with everybody's privilege to circulate privileged congressional documents.
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lower federal courts. In Miles v. McGrath7o the defendant, a lieutenantcommander in the navy and senior medical officer of his station, wrote in
response to a request from a navy captain, that the plaintiff's husband, a
commander in the navy, was unfit for duty because the plaintiff was a dope
addict.7 1 The federal district court in Maryland gave the statement an
absolute privilege.7 2 The court of appeals resumed its initiative in giving
the privilege to a report required by statute filed by the United States
consul in Bridgetown in Barbadoes. 3 A few years later it privileged the
Chairman of the Tariff Commission in accusing the plaintiff of trying to
swindle the government, though the statement, as the court put it, seems
to me to have been nothing more than an outburst of temper. 74 Shortly
afterward, another federal district court held an internal revenue agent
absolutely privileged in making an official report, though a demurrer to his
answer setting up the privilege was sustained because he had pleaded legal
75
conclusions.
The most influential case of this period was Glass v. Ickes,76 decided by
the court of appeals. The plaintiff had resigned from the Department of
the Interior and brought suit questioning a regulation which prohibited
his representing anyone before the Federal Tender Board for a limited
time after resignation; he was also soliciting funds to advocate amendment
of the Connally Hot Oil Act. Secretary Ickes issued a press release which
stated:
70. 4 F. Supp. 603 (D. Md. 1933).
71. This is one of the few cases in which the plaintiff was merely a collateral target
of the defamation. The court held the defamation of her "germane" to the inquiry.
It is also odd that the federal court in Maryland gave a broad scope to the privilege
though the state supreme court has been persistently opposed to it, while an earlier
federal case gave equally liberal application to the testimonial privilege. See note 50
supra.
72. The court also held the claim barred by the statute of limitations. It found
that the privilege given in the Spalding case extended to army and navy officers,
saying, "Such is the English rule, and the court in the Vilas Case relied upon the
English decisions." 4 F. Supp. at 605. The court did not cite the cases in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. It sustained a demurrer to the declaration,
with leave to amend.
73. United States ex rel. Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
The statement reflected upon the reputation of the plaintiff, a merchant in Bridgetown.
It was sent by the State Department to the Bureau of Domestic and Foreign Commerce,
and used in making up a trade directory, with a limited circulation. A demurrer to
the declaration was held properly sustained.
74. Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1937). The court affirmed a verdict
directed on the opening statement of counsel. It referred to the Tariff Commission as
having "executive and quasi judicial powers," (Id. at 770) which may raise a doubt
whether it rests on the executive or the judicial privilege.
75. Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Ky. 1938). The court also
held that it had no power to compel production of the report-an application of the
testimonial privilege. (The court says that the defendant was denied a subpoena, but
I think this is probably a mistake for the plaintiff.)
76. 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941).
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Mr. Glass has been barred from practice before the Department. The
Courts to date have refused Mr. Glass' prayer that this action be enjoined.
I suggest that oil operators given an opportunity by Mr. Glass to kick in to
his fund stop, look, and listen before they finance this proposed one-man
lobby.77
It seems that the words "barred from practice before the department"
(though a later passage in the release explained the reason) suggested
worse than the fact, but the court did not decide whether there was libel,
because it was able to dispose of the case on the defense of absolute
privilege. As the defendant was literally within the Spalding case, the
decision turned on whether the press release was "action having more or
less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control
or supervision," 78-the applicable doctrine which the court quoted from
the Spalding case. The court concluded that the release was absolutely
privileged, saying:
It seems obvious that, to communicate information respecting the appellants
incapacity to the indefinitely large group of persons with rights subject to the
Act, publication of an announcement in the press was proper, if not essential.7 9
77. Id. at 274.
78. Id. at 276.
79. Id. at 280. The court had already observed that there had been press publication in the Chatterton case, and that it had sanctioned such publication in the Mellon
case. It also relied heavily on the Spalding case, in which the statement had been sent
to some persons who were employees of the government and to some who no longer
were, and in which, though the defendant's duty was only to send the checks, he
was held privileged in sending an explanation as well. (The court also relied on United
States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914), which is not so nearly in point as the other
cases.) The Chatterton case, however, does not make clear the origin of the press
publication, which might have been no more than a report of the proceedings in
Parliament; the inadequate grounds of the Mellon case have been explored in the text
and notes at notes 65-69 supra. The publication in the Spalding case at least was
limited to claimants, and the defendant might have looked malicious if he had confined
it to those who were clients of the plaintiff, assuming that he knew who they were.
On the whole, then, the authority for the press release in the Glass case was not
impressive.
The question of relevance in the Glass case is also not simple. The majority concluded, since the plaintiff had unsuccessfully tried to represent a person before the
Department and later applied to oil operators for funds to reform the act, that: "It
would not appear entirely unreasonable under these circumstances for the Secretary to
conclude that it might be desirable to warn prospective client-donors that the appellant
could not then appear in representative capacity before the administrative agencies
charged by law with the enforcement of the Act." Id. at 281. Judge Groner, in his
concurring opinion, said that the complaint did not show that the plaintiff, at the
time of the press release, was trying to obtain clients to represent before the department,
and concluded: "If, therefore, as I have assumed, he had the right to advocate changes
in the law, and if it was alone the knowledge that he intended to assert this right
which provoked the action of the Secretary, it is difficult to explain satisfactorily in
what respect the Secretary's action was the performance of an official function." Id. at
281 (concurring opinion of Groner, J.).
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The case established a clear precedent for press releases, and not a narrow
one, for, from the last quotation, one might conclude that if the official
cannot conveniently reach his appropriate audience he is absolutely privileged to tell everybody. The case is also remarkable because Judge Groner,
while he concurred in the result, was the first judge of the court of appeals
to express doubts about the court's development of the privilege. Conceding that both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court had given a
broad scope to official authority, he said:
And, in this view I am impelled to concur in the opinion, though in doing so
I express with great deference the fear that in this and previous cases we
may have extended the rule beyond the reasons out of which it grew and thus
unwillingly created a privilege so extensive as to be almost unlimited and
altogether subversive of the fundamental principle that no man in this
country is so high that he is above the law. 80
D. TE FEDERAL CouRTS TnmoucrH 1957
For only the second time in its long sway the court of appeals denied an
absolute privilege to an executive officer in Colpoys v. Gates,8 ' holding that
a United States Marshal might be liable for explaining to the press his
reasons for discharging two deputies. The court limited the privilege of
public explanation to officers with political functions, reserved the question
whether this class included any officials but cabinet members, and said
that for officers without such functions "the thing held to be privileged
has usually if not always been an act in the general line of duty, not a
separate discussion or explanation." 82 An act, of course, might be a defamatory statement. The privilege was later given to the superintendent of a
hospital for stating, in his return to a writ of habeas corpus, that the plain83
tiff was insane and giving his reasons.
This case ended the predominance of the court of appeals which, except
for two decisions in federal district courts,8 4 had endured since 1896. In
the next year the doctrine of absolute executive privilege gained valuable
adherents in Gregoire v. Biddle,8 5 which, though it was not a defamation
80. Id. at 282.
81. 118 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1941). The other case was the Haan case discussed
in the text and notes at notes 63 & 64 supra.
82. Id. at 17.
83. Cassell v. Overholser, 169 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 939
(1949). It seems obvious that the judicial privilege is the appropriate one for this
case, but the court did not say so and cited the Glass case.
I pass over Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
665 (1941), as too cursory for use on the question of defamation.
84. See notes 70-72, 75 upra and accompanying text.
85. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). The action
was for false arrest. Judge Learned Hand's strong opinion in favor of the privilege
has often been quoted, and notably by the Supreme Court in Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564, at 571-72 (1959).
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case, has since exerted great influence on the rule. In the next few years
the privilege was given by other federal courts to employees of a federal
internal revenue office, 86 to a psychiatrist in a United States government
hospital, 87 and to the chief of the dietetic service in a Veteran's Administration hospital.8 8 The Tenth Circuit meanwhile doubted that it ought to
give the privilege to a state hospital psychologist because it found no
89
more than a qualified privilege permitted in the state cases. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia ended the period by giving the
privilege to a government personnel officer. 90
E. Tm BarrAin HowardCAsEs (1957-1959)
The next case decided by the court of appeals was Barr v. Matteo,91 which
came before it in 1957. In the Barr case92 the plaintiffs worked in the office
of the Housing Expediter, an Agency under the Director of Economic
Stabilization, and were the originators of a plan under which funds earmarked for terminal leaves in the fiscal year were used to pay accrued
annual leave, by discharging the employees and rehiring them at once as
temporary employees. The defendant, at the time general manager of the
Agency, opposed the plan on the ground that it violated the Thomas
amendment, but the Housing Expediter permitted its use by 53 members
of the Agency, including the plaintiffs. Two and a half years later there
was criticism of this action in the Senate which was widely reported in
the press. One of the plaintiffs prepared a reply which was sent to the
defendant's office, where a secretary signed it during his absence. The
defendant, then temporarily acting director of the agency, later issued a
press release stating that he had opposed the plan and would suspend the
two plaintiffs as soon as his appointment as acting director became effective.
The general accounting office later ruled the payments illegal, but one of
86. Tinkoff v. Campbell, 86 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1949). Apparently the statements were made to the clients of the plaintiff, an income tax specialist, so the case
privileges more than an internal report. It actually raises an important issue but the
opinion makes nothing of this point and I therefore say no more of it.
87. Taylor v. Glotfelty, 201 F.2d 51 (6th Cir.), affirming 102 F. Supp. 7 (E.D.
Ky. 1952).
88. Carson v. Behlen, 136 F. Supp. 222 (D.R.I. 1955).
89. Iverson v. Frandsen, 237 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1956). This is the first case
known to me in which a federal court endeavored to determine state law on the point.
The court held that it did not have to decide the question because there was no evidence of express malice.
90. Newbury v. Love, 242 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 889
(1957). There seem to have been other good reasons for this result, but the court
chose to rest on this one.
91. 244 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Danaher, J., dissenting). Perhaps it is worthwhile to observe that this case was argued before the Newbury case, note 90 supra, but
decided after it.
92. I take the facts from the final decision by the Supreme Court, 360 U.S. 564
(1959).
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the plaintiffs took the question to the Court of Claims, which held that the
plan was not a violation of law. The plaintiffs were ultimately reinstated
by the Director of Economic Stabilization.
Despite the activity of the court of appeals in extending absolute privilege, this case contained a combination which it had not previously sanctioned-an official beneath cabinet rank who had issued a defamatory press
release-but as the defendant stood higher than the United States Marshal
in the Colpoys case, the outcome was doubtful. The court held, following
the Colpoys case, that "in explaining his decision to the general public, the
defendant went entirely outside his line of duty."93 After some delay, the
case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, 94 where the court of
appeals, which feared to go too far, was reversed for not going far enough.
Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for himself and three others, 95 saw the interests
as:
[O]n the one hand, the protection of the individual citizen against pecuniary
damage caused by oppressive or malicious action on the part of officials of the
Federal Government; and on the other, the protection of the public interest
by shielding responsible governmental officers against the harassment and
inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought on
account of action taken in the exercise of their official responsiblities.0 6
He decided in favor of the privilege, reasoning that the size and complexity
of modem government require delegation of important functions, and that
the duties, not the title, of an officer should determine the privilege. He
thought the question "close" 97 in this case, but found that the release was
"within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty."9 8
Mr. Justice Black's concurrence was necessary to make the majority, and
he gave it on a ground that so far as my observation goes, is new. He
contended that the operation of a free government requires an informed
public opinion, with freedom to criticize, and that making the defendant
liable to suits would restrain him from criticizing.99 While Mr. Justice
Stewart dissented, it was not because he disagreed with Justice Harlan's
statement of the law, but only with its application to the facts of the case;
93. 244 F.2d at 768.
94. In 355 U.S. 171 (1957) the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded to
the court of appeals with instructions to consider qualified privilege. In 256 F.2d 890
(D.C. Cir. 1958), the court of appeals held that there was a qualified privilege which
might have been lost by malice. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari in 358
U.S. 917 (1958), and the final opinions reversing the court of appeals on the issue of
absolute privilege appear in 360 U.S. 564, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959).
95. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, and Whittaker.
96. 360 U.S. at 565.
97. Id. at 574.
98. Id. at 575.
99. Thus, the nature of a free government is used on both sides of the argument.
Contrast Baron Eyre's opinion in the Sutton case. See also the discussion in the text
pp. 1128-29 supra.
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it seems likely that he would be with the majority in most cases, and in fact
he joined it in another decided the same day. 0 0
Thus, the five-four decision is, for some purposes, actually six-three; and
in substance, it approved both of the innovations of the court of appeals,
in extending the Spalding case to officials below cabinet rank and in sanctioning press releases, while applying them more broadly than the court
of appeals had been willing to. There is a question whether the decision
otherwise increased the scope of the privilege. The phrasing of the
Spalding case, "action having more or less connection with the general
matters committed by law to his control or supervision,"' 0 ' and the clause,
"the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty,"10 2 are both so broad that
it is hard to say that one includes more than the other.
Chief Justice Warren, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joined, criticized
the majority opinion for giving officials no certain guide to the scope of the
privilege. Assuming, moreover, that the majority had correctly stated the
interests to be balanced, he contended that only internal reports of lower
officials should be absolutely privileged, while the privilege for press releases should be restricted to officials of cabinet rank and, perhaps, others
whom the President appoints and can hold responsible. Finally, in his
opinion, the majority had balanced the wrong interests. The interest in
protecting officials against libel suits in order to secure public information
should be balanced against the public interest in fearless criticism of
officials, which is inhibited if the critic is subject to absolutely privileged
replies while he has himself no more than a qualified privilege in criticizing
officials. 10 3 I am not sure but believe that the Chief Justice would nevertheless give the absolute privilege to press releases by officials of cabinet
rank and others appointed by and responsible to the President.
Mr. Justice Brennan's separate dissent pointed out that the executive
privilege applies to a wider group than either the legislative or the judicial
privileges, and that the first of these is constitutional, while the courts
have peculiar competence to deal with the second. He doubted that officials would be inhibited by the fear of suits, thought that Congress was
a more appropriate forum for debating absolute privilege, and suggested
that if tort suits did inconvenience the government, Congress' solution
might be to amend the Tort Claims Act to provide for state liability.
One must remember that Mr. Justice Black has since expressed the view that the
law of defamation is inconsistent with the first amendment. See Justice Black and First
Amendment "Absolutes:" A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 549, 557-58 (1962).
100. He thought the press release was in self-defense and not the performance of a
duty. But he concurred in Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
101. See the text accompanying note 54 supra.
102. See the text accompanying note 98 supra.
103. "It [the absolute privilege] will sanctify the powerful and silence debate."
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 585 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Contrast
Justice Black's opinion upon the effect of limiting officials to a qualified privilege.
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In Howard v. Lyons,10 4 decided on the same day, the defendant, a navy
officer commanding the Boston Naval Shipyard, withdrew recognition from
a union local and sent a report to his superiors explaining his action, in
which he defamed the plaintiffs, officers of the union. He also sent copies
to each member of Congress from Massachusetts. The Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit held him absolutely privileged in making the report
to his superiors, but gave him only a qualified privilege for the publication
to members of Congress. 10 5 In the Supreme Court only the publication to
the Congressmen was in issue; and the Court, after holding unanimously
10 6
that the privilege of a federal official is a matter of federal, not state, law,
divided as one would expect from the opinions in the Barr case. The major-

ity, joined by Mr. justice Stewart, held the publication absolutely privileged
with Justice Black concurring for the reasons he stated in the Barr case.
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in the Barr case was also an opinion in this
case, and Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented
107
again.

F. AFm= BarrAND Howard CASES (1957-1962)
These cases have settled the federal rule for the time being, if not in its
ultimate detail, still in general in favor of an extensive application of
absolute privilege. The applications in the lower federal courts of course
have followed the Supreme Court. 10 8 Two of them seem to my prejudiced
104. 360 U.S. 593 (1959), reversing 250 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1958).
105. Judge Woodbury dissented, on the ground that the defendant should also
have been given an absolute privilege for the publication to Congressmen.
106. This is the first determination of the point in defamation by the Supreme
Court, though the vagueness of the line between state and federal law prior to Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), probably accounts for the lack of prior decision.
107. The majority relied in part on a "Memorandum of Instructions issued by the
Secretary of the Navy which petitioner has with our leave filed in this Court," (360
U.S. at 597) which stated: "Members of Congress are very anxious to keep in touch
with what is going on in their respective states and districts. Navy agencies shall
keep them advised, if possible in advance, of any new actions or curtailment of actions
which may affect them." 360 U.S. at 597-98 n.2 (1959). Mr. Chief Justice Warren commented thus on the use of this document: "For the first time on reargument in this
Court, the Government produced the letter from the Secretary of the Navy referred to
in the Court's opinion. The paragraph relied on is nothing more than a general policy
statement applicable only to 'Navy agencies.' The letter was in no way directed toward labor problems-and the quoted portion is but a few lines in a five-page letter
sent to a general distribution list and apparently never inserted in the Federal Register
or any Navy Manual. Obviously, this letter was not cited by Captain Howard because
he was unaware of its existence-or its applicability." Id. at 599.
108. In Pearson v. Wright, 156 F. Supp. 136 (D.C. Cir. 1957), which was decided
after the court of appeals' decision in the Barr case and before the reversal in the
Supreme Court, the defendant, chairman of a commission on government security,
made a defamatory response in a letter replying to a request from the chairman of a
congressional subcommittee, and issued a press release on the same matter. Judge
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eye to have gone beyond it, one of them giving the privilege to a defamatory press conference conducted by a special assistant attorney general, 10 9
and the other to a defamation in a speech, with the identification of the
plaintiff supplied later in testimony before a Senate subcommittee. 110 On
Holtzoff, who had been the trial judge in the Barr case and had limited the defendant
to a qualified privilege, held that the letter was absolutely privileged, but, relying on
the court of appeals' decision in the Barr case, gave the press release only a qualified
privilege. There is, of course, a question how this case would have been decided if it
had arisen after the Supreme Court's final decision.
In Preble v. Johnson, 275 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1960), the court gave the privilege
to various employees of an air base for statements to the chairman of a grievance
committee in an inquiry started by the plaintiff, and to other persons investigating the
matter. The base commander was also held absolutely privileged in writing a memorandum giving his reasons for firing the plaintiff, which was published in some unexplained manner. The court found all the defendants clearly within the line drawn
in the Barrcase.
In Gaines v. Wren, 185 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Ga. 1960) the privilege was given to
the acting industrial relations officer of an army depot for giving defamatory reasons
for the plaintiff's discharge, in response to a request from a prospective employer,
although the plaintiff was finally exonerated of the charges. (The court in one passage
limits the privilege to cases in which there is no malice, but this seems to be an
inadvertence. Id. at 777.)
See also Porter v. Eyster, 294 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1961), which, though it depended
on state law, shows the attitude of the court toward the Supreme Court cases. The
board of stewards of a race track ruled the plaintiff, a veterinary, off the track, and
a notice to this effect was posted on the track bulletin board, and the fact was also
published in racing papers. The plaintiff was later licensed to practice at all the state
tracks. The action was for libel and under the insulting words statute against the
chairman of the board of stewards of the track. The court held that the state racing
commission had an absolute privilege and said that under the Barr case this privilege
would extend to the track stewards. But, in the absence of state authority on the
question whether the state commission had power to delegate to the board of stewards,
it also held that the defendant had not abused a qualified privilege.
I should also mention Morton Int'l Corp. v. FDIC, 199 F. Supp. 702 (D. Mass.
1961), in which the FDIC issued a press release stating that a certain traffic in
certificates of deposit would not qualify for insurance under federal statutes. It does
not appear that the plaintiff was named in the release. The action (probably for
disparagement rather than libel) was for an injunction and a declaratory judgment,
and not for damages. The court held that under the Barr and Howard cases the
defendant had an absolute privilege.
109. Sauber v. Gliedman, 283 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 906
(1961). The force of the Barr case is very clearly seen in the history of this decision.
The defendant, a special assistant attorney general to prosecute charges on which the
plaintiff had been indicted, made defamatory statements at a press conference. One
trial judge held, following the court of appeals' decision in the Barr case, that the
statement was not absolutely privileged, but after the reversal in the Supreme Court,
another trial judge, on renewal of the motion for summary judgment, held that the
defendant had an absolute privilege. The circuit court of appeals affirmed this
decision.
110. Steinberg v. O'Connor, 200 F. Supp. 737 (D. Conn. 1961). The defendant,
an official of the state department with rank equivalent to an assistant secretary of
state, and with authority in the Passport Office, made a speech before representatives
of the VFW in which he used strong language about persons applying for passports
in order to go abroad and help the communist cause. He did not mention the plaintiff by name in this speech, but in later testimony before a Senate subcommittee he
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the other hand there have been two statements by lower courts indicating
that they are aware of dangers in the expansion of the privilege. 1
The development of the privilege in the federal courts has been so much
in one direction that there is scarcely any need of a summary. These courts
have given the privilege a far broader scope and far more clarity of outline
than the English cases, and have consistently enlarged not only the class of
officials but also the class of publications that enjoy it, and all this almost
without dissent until the problem returned to the Supreme Court in 1959.
III. Tim AMMUCAN STATE CASES
An advocate preparing to persuade a state supreme court one way or
the other on the question of absolute executive privilege would be well
advised to collect dicta as well as decisions, and to collect the cases on the
other privileges and the other torts as well. This summary of the American
state cases has not been undertaken with anything so ambitious in mind.
My object has been the more limited one of finding out how far the courts
have gone in granting the privilege and how far in rejecting it when it
seems reasonably clear that it has been presented to them. I have not cited
a case as authority denying the privilege unless it appears that the defendant actually claimed it, or the court at least seriously considered giving it.
This has led me to omit some cases quite often cited in other cases or in
the other literature, and this account may not in consequence adequately
represent the courts that have denied the privilege. Conversely, I have
assumed that a case is not authority for giving the privilege unless the
defendant could with some appearance of reason be called an executive
identified the plaintiff as one of the persons. The court held the speech within the
shield of the Barr and Howard cases.
111. In Ogden v. Association of the United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498 (D.
Colo. 1959), the defendant, under contract with the United States, published a book
on the Korean War which defamed the plaintiff. Judge Holtzoff actually held that the
statute of limitations had run, but, though he did not rule the point, said that the defendant had pleaded absolute privilege and observed: "It might be said, however, that
the Court would not be inclined to extend the doctrine of absolute privilege beyond its
scope as defined by the Supreme Court, since absolute privilege whittles away one of
the most precious private rights protected by law, namely, the right to reputation."
Id. at 502. The opinion does not cite the Barr and Howard cases, but its date makes
it fairly certain that they were in the judge's mind.
In Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1962), affirming 187 F. Supp. 841
(E.D.N.Y. 1960), the court held that an internal report of an employee of the Social
Security Administration was absolutely privileged, but observed that the Gregoire, Barr
and Howard cases "while perhaps couched in language supporting the claim of absolute privilege regardless of the nature of the public office or employment, in fact
involve relatively important official positions. . . . There has been some uncertainty
among scholars as to the reach of absolute privilege to the lower echelons of administrative employees. Cf. Prosser on Torts, 2d ed. (1955), Sec. 95, p. 612. While the
language of the recent cases indicates an unlimited reach to the privilege, it may be
possible that a case involving such an administrative employee at a minor grade might
lead to a re-examination of the language." Id. at 360-61.
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official. I have made no attempt to collect dicta, which are very numerous.

The courts, moreover, have not always said whether they meant the executive, or the legislative or judicial privilege, and the kind is not always obvious from the facts. For example, it is largely a matter of luck, I think,
whether a case arising out of a discharge proceeding or a city council

meeting, falls under the executive privilege or one of the others. I cannot
hope to have been consistent in the application of these tests, which, particularly in trying to exclude cases in which the absolute privilege was not
claimed, and in trying to distinguish between the judicial, legislative, and
executive privileges, require a more refined classification than the cases
sometimes permit.
I have divided the jurisdictions into three groups: (1) those which
have not dealt with an officer of cabinet rank, and which have only a decision or two; (2) those which have not dealt with an officer of cabinet rank
but have developed a considerable body of authority; (3) the few states
that have had a case against an officer of cabinet rank or near it.

Group 1.-In five states there are rather clear decisions denying an absolute privilege to a lower official. Alabama has denied it to officials of a
state normal school;" 2 and Massachusetts, in refusing it to the members of

an investigating committee appointed by the inhabitants of a town, has said
that the privilege is limited to "comparatively few cases."113 Minnesota,
while declining to give the privilege to a postmaster for a letter defaming
an employee to the Postmaster General, has indicated that it will limit lower
officials generally to a qualified privilege." 4 Mississippi in a recent case
has denied the privilege to a sheriff," 5 and West Virginia has refused it to
112. Kenney v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 95 So. 34 (1923) (no error in denying an
absolute privilege to the medical director and dean of women of the school, but the
defendants' motion for a new trial should have been granted because there was no
evidence of express malice).
113. Howland v. Flood, 160 Mass. 509, 516, 36 N.E. 482 (1894). The defendants'
report, which was published in a newspaper, defamed a member of a firm of civil
engineers which was building a waterworks for the town. The defendants were given
a new trial, however, for error in rejecting their evidence. The value of the case is
doubtful at best because it is not clear that the defendants were officials within any
common definition of that term; and, moreover, it seems doubtful that they claimed
more than a qualified privilege.
114. Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 129 N.W. 147 (1917). The action
was technically for loss of the plaintiff's job, but the court said that the same privilege
should apply as in libel. It cited the Spalding case, but doubted that it should be extended to public officials generally. Since the Howard case, of course, a state court
would be obliged to apply the federal rule.
115. Krebs v. McNeal, 222 Miss. 560, 76 So. 2d 693 (1955). The case certainly
could be put on the ground that the defendant was outside the line of duty by any
definition. The plaintiff was running for the democratic nomination for sheriff and the
defendant, the incumbent, was supporting his opponent. Shortly before the election
someone shot at the plaintiff while he was driving at night; and the defendant, after
investigating, told several people, including a newspaper editor, that the plaintiff had
put the bullets in the car himself in order to influence the election. The court said
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a city policeman. 116 In three other states there are cases that might be
taken as denying the privilege, though in all of them there is much room
for doubt. An Indiana appellate court case contains language that may deny
an absolute privilege to a member of a school board, but it is not clear.11 7
The Oregon Supreme Court seems to have interpreted one of its own earlier
cases as refusing the privilege to the board of directors of a school district." 8
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has said that the members of a commission to investigate charges of malfeasance in the prisons of the state would
have a qualified privilege, 119 but the weight of the case is hard to assess.
With some hesitation I add to this group the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
which has given some form of the sovereign immunity to various officials
of the University of Texas, but with qualifying language suggesting that
120
they might have been liable if they acted with malice.
There are, on the other hand, three states in which a single decision gives
the privilege to lower officials. The Idaho court has allowed it to the
members of a school board. 121 In Nebraska, after an early case denying the
that an absolutely privileged communication is one "in the interest of the public service
or the due administration of justice," which would be consistent with a rather broad
executive privilege, but it added that practically it "is limited to legislative, judicial,
and military proceedings." Id. at 576, 76 So. 2d at 699. A verdict and judgment for
the plaintiff were affirmed.
116. City of Mullens v. Davidson, 133 W. Va. 557, 57 S.E.2d 1 (1949). The action
was assumpsit on the policeman's bond.
117. Henry v. Moberly, 6 Ind. App. 490, 33 N.E. 981 (1892). The defendant
made charges against the plaintiff, a teacher, to other board members, and the court
said that there was no question of absolute privilege in the case, which might, in the
context, mean either that there was no such privilege or that the defendant did not
ask for it. The court directed the trial court to sustain a demurrer to the complaint
for failure to allege express malice, with leave to amend. Subsequent proceedings in
23 Ind. App. 305, 51 N.E. 497 (1899) add no light.
118. Samuelson v. Vinyard, 120 Ore. 197, 251 Pac. 719 (1926). The board adopted
a defamatory resolution dismissing the plaintiff, a teacher. The court did not define the
privilege, though it reversed a verdict for the plaintiff and held that a nonsuit should
have been entered at the close of her case. The defendants, however, claimed that
they had acted without malice. In Grubb v. Johnson, 289 P.2d 1067 (Ore. 1955),
which is not otherwise in point, the court pointed out that it had said in the Samuelson
case that there was no evidence of malice. From the language in this opinion it seems
improbable that the absolute executive privilege will be extended to lower officials.
119. In re Investigating Comm'n, 16 R.I. 751, 11 Adt. 429 (1887). The opinion (an
advisory opinion to the Governor) does not mention absolute privilege.
120. Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
889, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 921 (1959). The court sustained a plea in abatement
that asserted that the defendants could not be sued without legislative consent because
they acted as representatives of the University of Texas and had the state immunity,
and dismissed the suit against the officials without prejudice.
121. Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho 609, 123 Pac. 478 (1912). The board, failing to
dissuade a school superintendent from running for city clerk against a candidate
supported by members of the board, passed a series of orders minutely guiding the
plaintiff in the performance of his duties; it is doubtful that they were defamatory,
though they set a record for petty persecution. The court said that as long as the board
members were acting within their official powers their motives could not be ques-
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privilege to a mayor for words spoken at a public meeting of the city
council, 122 the court gave it to a state superintendent of public instruction
for a letter defaming a school teacher, to a county superintendent, with
language indicating that the privilege may reach low in the hierarchy.'23
The Washington court has given protection to a United States District Attorney in slandering the plaintiff before a secret service agent of the United
States Treasury, without identifying the privilege. 124 In two other states,
Louisiana 125 and Missouri, 126 there are equivocal statements which might
mean that the privilege can extend to lower officials.
There are three states in which statutes make it probable that the privilege will cover lower officials; but, as one of them, California, has a case
against an official of cabinet rank, it will be considered later. 12 7 Under a
statute providing a privilege "in any other official proceeding authorized
by law,"128 the Utah court has held that a member of a city council was
absolutely privileged in defaming a deputy marshal at a public meeting of
the council. 129 The Oklahoma court has given the privilege to the president
of a state university for charges against an employee at a regular meeting
tioned; in spite of its equivocation with the words "lawful" and "unlawfur' the court
seemed to intend an absolute privilege. It affirmed a judgment sustaining a demurrer
to the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
122. Greenwood v. Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449, 42 N.W. 413 (1889), aff'd on rehearing,
30 Neb. 579, 46 N.W. 711 (1890). The court recognized the legislative and judicial
privileges, but said that statements like this one had only a qualified privilege. But
it found no claim that the privilege had been abused and held that this count failed
to state a cause of action.
123. De Bolt v. McBrien, 96 Neb. 237, 147 N.W. 462 (1914). The opinion does
not mention the Greenwood case.
R~hodes v. Star Herald Printing Co., 173 Neb. 496, 113 N.W.2d 658 (1962) probably
does not weaken this case because the defendant sheriff apparently did not claim an
absolute privilege.
124. Stivers v. Allen, 115 Wash. 136, 196 Pac. 663 (1921). There is some reason
to think that the court actually relied on the testimonial privilege protecting informers.
125. Fisk v. Soniat, 33 La. Ann. 1400 (1881). The court held the members of a
police jury "privileged" (Id. at 1402) in making charges against the plaintiff in their
official capacity. The plaintiff alleged but did not prove malice, and the court did not
use the phrase "absolute privilege" or refer to the difference between absolute and
qualified privilege. The case also may be weakened for the executive privilege by the
fact that the court, besides referring to the defendants' "official capacity" said that
they had "a quasi judicial authority." Ibid.
126. Callahan v. Ingram, 122 Mo. 355, 26 S.W. 1020 (1894). This case was
overruled on another point in Minter v. Bradstreet Co., 174 Mo. 444, 73 S.W. 668
(1903). A city council member defamed the superintendent of streets, and the court
said that no one could slander others when he did not have an absolute privilege, which
it left undefined. It found that the charge was not pertinent to any inquiry before the
council. It reversed a judgment for the plaintiff for other errors.
127. See the text accompanying notes 179-83 infra.
128. I quote the statute from the case, Carter v. Jackson, 351 P.2d 957, 958 n.2
(Utah 1960).
129. See note 128 supra. It would be logical to assign this case to the legislative
privilege, but other language of the section specified the legislative and judicial privileges, and still the court rested upon the more general language quoted in the text.
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of the board of regents, 130 under a statute giving a privilege for communications "in the proper discharge of an official duty." 131 A later case relied
upon this one in giving the privilege to the president of a state university

and the dean of its medical school.132
This summary should, of course, be taken with the caution that a single
decision or two denying the privilege to a given lower official on a given
occasion is not very strong evidence that the privilege will not be given to
some other lower official on some other occasion. On the other hand, the
decisions giving the privilege to a lower official fairly definitely commit the
courts to it. But even this much generalization is dangerous, as the following review of the states with more authority will show.
Group 2.-Among the state courts, Maryland has been the most persistently opposed to the privilege. As early as 1880 this court denied an absolute privilege to the superintendent of the naval academy at Annapolis for
an endorsement which he sent to his superiors about an employee who had

resigned. 133 The court expressed a distaste for extending absolute privileges
beyond the legislative and judicial branches, 34 and a strong preference for

Chief Justice Cockburn's dissent in the Paulet case.135 Nearly eighty years
later, in an action by an artist against the Mayor of Baltimore for calling
his painting obscene and ordering it removed from the municipal museum,
the court recalled its hostility, recognized the absolute executive privilege,
but refused to decide whether a mayor could have it, and held that he was
outside the scope of his duty in any event. 136 Even since the Barr case
130. Sanford v. Howard, 185 Okla. 660, 95 P.2d 644 (1939). Four judges dissented
without opinion.
131. Id. at 661, 95 P.2d at 646. Another subsection gave a privilege to legislative
and judicial proceedings "or any other proceeding authorized by law." Ibid.
132. Hughes v. Bizzell, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P.2d 763 (1941). The action was technically for conspiracy to cause the plaintiff's dismissal as librarian of the medical
school, but the court relied on the Sanford case and the statute and said that the statements were absolutely privileged.
133. Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 (1880). One judge dissented on the ground
that the defendant should have had an absolute privilege.
134. "The doctrine of absolute privilege is so inconsistent with the rule that a
remedy should exist for every wrong, that we are not disposed to extend it beyond
the strict line established by a concurrence of decisions." Id. at 253-54.
135. "We concur in the views taken in his opinion, and believing that they state the
true rule of law, shall adopt them rather than the conclusions reached by the two
judges who sat with him." Id. at 256.
The court recognized the testimonial privilege, but refused to apply it to the endorsement on the ground that the Secretary of the Navy had not objected to publication of
the statement and had furnished a certified copy for use at the trial.
136. Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 129 A.2d 148 (1957). The court said:
"Though we are not deciding in this case whether or not the doctrine of absolute privilege should be extended to such an office as that of Mayor of a great city, we think
that the same reasoning which underlies the reluctance to extend the offices to which
the privilege applies, should also make us reluctant to stretch the field in which an
absolute privilege may be invoked by adopting a very broad view of what may be
deemed closely related to the general matters committed to the control or supervision
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settled federal policy in favor of the privilege, the court has shown that it

will give no more ground than it must. In Carr v. Watkins,137 an employee
of the security division of a naval laboratory and two county police officers

joined in defaming the plaintiff, and the court held that under the Barr
case it was obliged to give the federal employee an absolute privilege if he

had acted within the scope of his duties, which, on the pleading, it thought
doubtful, but it refused to give the policemen more than a qualified privilege.

In Kentucky, though the court has often recognized the privilege, it is
given very narrow scope, and I have found only two cases that might grant
it. In an early case in which a common school trustee made charges against
his predecessor to the county school superintendent, it is not clear that the
defendant claimed the privilege, but if he did, the court denied it, saying

that the privilege was confined to the heads of government departments. 138
A few years later the court used language which would also give the privilege to lower officials communicating with heads of executive departments,
but spoke strongly against extending it, and denied it to a county school
superintendent who sent a defamatory report about a teacher to the state

superintendent. 139 Some years later it used the same formula but the
case, an action against the members of a city real estate commission (appointed by the Governor) for a report defaming a real estate agent, actually
rests, I think, on the judicial privilege. 140 In the same year, the court again
used similar language in describing the privilege, but denied it to the trustee
of a school district and the chairman of its building committee.'41 Finally,
in Catronv. Jasper,142 the court allowed an absolute privilege and probably,
though it is not certain, the executive privilege. A sheriff stated to his
of a public officer." Id. at 173, 129 A.2d at 153. The language about absolute privilege
was actually written in discussing other torts charged in the complaint, but the court
expressly said it applied to the defamation counts.
137. 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962).
138. Ranson v. West, 125 Ky. 457, 101 S.W. 885 (1907). The defendant had judgment on demurrer, however, for lack of sufficient allegation of malice.
139. Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S.W. 878 (1910). The plaintiff was
allowed to keep a verdict on the ground that she had made a jury case of malice to
defeat a qualified privilege. (In considering the question of qualified privilege the court
held that the defendant was not acting in his official capacity in writing to the state
superintendent, as he was concerned only with county schools. I do not believe that
this is the reason the court denied an absolute privilege.)
140. McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S.W. 88 (1926). The court's
language and its citation of the Spalding case would perhaps support an argument
that it rests on the executive privilege. The court affirmed a judgment for the defendant
on demurrer. There was an allegation that the information was given to newspapers,
but nothing was made of this.
141. Bonham v. Dotson, 216 Ky. 660, 288 S.W. 297 (1926). A complaint alleging
express malice was held to state a cause of action.
142. 303 Ky. 598, 198 S.W.2d 322 (1946). The court relied on the Harwood case,
note 75 supra, and the Stivers case, note 124 supra. A directed verdict for the defendant was affirmed.
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deputy that the plaintiff had liquor on his premises and was illegally selling
it, and the deputy obtained a search warrant, but no liquor was found.
The court reserved the question whether the privilege would extend further
than to communications between officers. If this case rests on the executive
privilege, its force is weakened by the fact that it was an indictable offense
for a sheriff or deputy not to enforce the local option law after receiving
notice of a violation. 143 Thus, this court has recognized the privilege for
heads of departments and for internal reports to them, in dicta, and has,
at most, two cases that may allow it, but both of them are questionable.
The development illustrates very well the danger of attempting to generalize
for a jurisdiction from a case or two.
The position of the Michigan court is very hard to determine, in spite
of fairly numerous cases. In one early case in which the point arose indirectly, the court held an alderman absolutely privileged in presenting a
resolution to the common council of a city, without identifying the privilege;
from the facts, it seems that the legislative privilege would be the most appropriate. 144 Later the court gave an absolute privilege to a mayor's veto
message addressed to the common council of a city, and again it did not
identify the privilege, though the executive privilege is the logical explanation. 145 In 1917 the court first clearly distinguished among the privileges,
holding that an ex officio member of a city's board of estimate was absolutely privileged in debate at a meeting of the board, but it intended the
legislative or judicial privilege, not the executive. 146 In 1925 the court held
that a defendant, oddly described as "a state official entitled to be called
budget director,"147 was not absolutely privileged in defaming a contractor
to a state administrative board, saying that he was not on the board "and
had no duties or relations to any legislative body that would clothe him
with such a privilege,"'148 and using language that would confine the executive privilege to military affairs.149 A later case suggested that the members
143. In Stewart v. Williams, 309 Ky. 706, 218 S.W.2d 948 (1949), the executive
privilege might have been in issue, but the court refused to pass on it because the
evidence showed that there was no malice.
144. Wachsmuth v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 96 Mich. 426, 56 N.W. 9 (1893).
145. Trebilcock v. Anderson, 117 Mich. 39, 75 N.W. 129 (1898). The court relied
on the Wachsmuth case. Newspaper publication was alleged but nothing was made
of this point.
146. Bolton v. Walker, 197 Mich. 699, 164 N.W. 420 (1917). The only language
that could refer to the executive privilege occurs in a quotation from Newell, Slander
and Libel, which mentions the military privilege.
147. Raymond v. Croll, 233 Mich. 268, 271, 206 N.W. 556 (1925).
148. Id. at 273, 206 N.W. at 557.
149. "Our court recognizes the rule of absolute privilege, but it has repeatedly refused to extend its application beyond the necessities of the judicial, legislative, and
military occasions." Id. at 273, 206 N.W. at 557, citing, inter alia, the Bolton and
Trebilcock cases. The court held that the defendant had a qualified privilege and that
the plaintiff had not enough evidence of express malice, and remanded the case with
instructions to enter judgment for the defendant.

1962]

PRIVILEGE OF EXECUTIVE

1155

of a city's department of health might have been absolutely privileged in
reporting to the common council, but the court may well not have had the
executive privilege in mind.150 As in Kentucky, the latest case in point
allows the privilege but is weakened by a special statute.151 The court
held that a member of the state liquor commission had an absolute privilege for a letter to the state civil service commission opposing a reorganization plan and reflecting upon the plaintiff, who was designated for a
position of authority in the new program. The court, while relying at least
in part upon a special statute providing against personal liability of members of the commission, seems also to have considered the letter privileged
2
on common law grounds. 5
In New York the privilege has been recognized but, I think because of
the peculiarities of the cases that have arisen, it has not often been applied.
In Hemmens v. Nelson,153 the principal of a state institution for deaf mutes
made defamatory charges about an employee to the chairman of its board
of trustees and to its executive committee. It is not clear that the defendant
claimed an absolute privilege; the court of appeals, at any rate, gave him
only a qualified one, saying that the courts had refused to expand absolute
privileges and that it would assume none applied in this case, though it was
hard to distinguish this case from those in which it did apply. The supreme
court and appellate division later denied an absolute privilege to an investigating officer for statements made to the press; 15 4 though the defendant
did not claim the executive privilege, 155 it seems unlikely that a change in
labels would have made a difference. The court of claims also denied the
150. Powers v. Vaughan, 312 Mich. 297, 20 N.W.2d, 196 (1945). The case is
weakened by the court's conclusion that even if the privilege were only qualified,
there was not enough evidence of malice.
151. Schlinkert v. Henderson, 331 Mich. 284, 49 N.W.2d 180 (1951). The case
perhaps involves a press release, as the plaintiff alleged, and the defendant admitted a
release of the letter to newspapers; while the court did not say that it was actually
published, it did say that the public interest justified public dissemination.
152. The court said that the statute gave more immunity than there would have been
otherwise, but it subsequently considered other authority for its conclusion.
153. 138 N.Y. 517, 34 N.E. 342 (1893). A directed verdict for the defendant was
affirmed for lack of evidence of malice to rebut the qualified privilege.
I omit Galligan v. Kelly, 31 N.Y. Supp. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1894) from the sequence,
because its grounds are not clear. The court dismissed a complaint by a principal
against the trustees of a school for sending defamatory charges against him to the
board of education. It gave a variety of reasons and among them, privilege, but did
not say that it was absolute and did not discuss qualified privilege or malice.
154. Jacobs v. Herlands, 17 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 259 App. Div. 823,
19 N.Y.S.2d 770, (1940). In an earlier appeal, the appellate division had held the
defense of privilege insufficiently pleaded, giving leave to amend. 257 App. Div. 1050,
13 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1939).
It is interesting to contrast the Sauber case, note 109 supra, decided by the Seventh
Circuit after the Barr case.
155. He seems to have claimed the judicial privilege and an absolute privilege to
report an official proceeding. See the opinion in the special term, cited in note 154
supra.
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privilege to a report of the State Department of Audit and Control. 156 The
15 7
court of appeals returned to the question in 1959 in Cheatum v. Wehle;
the state Conservation Commissioner slandered one of his bureau chiefs in
an after-dinner speech; and the court, though it recognized the executive
privilege, refused to apply it to the speech. 158 The court of claims followed this case in denying the privilege to statements made to a reporter
by an assistant attorney-general about a case he was investigating; 15 9 the
appellate division agreed that there was no absolute privilege, but reversed
on the ground that since the assistant attorney-general was outside the line
of duty, the state could not be held. 16° From this development it seems
likely that the New York courts would extend the privilege to lower officials,
but have had a number of extreme cases in which they have felt obliged to
hold the official outside the scope of his duties.
In Illinois I have not found a supreme court decision, but the appellate
court has extended the privilege very far. After an early case denying the
judicial privilege to a county superintendent who gave defamatory reasons
for revoking the plaintiff's teaching license at a public meeting of the board
of directors, 161 the court allowed what may have been the executive privilege to charges which the architect of a board of education filed with a
156. Peeples v. State, 179 Misc. 272, 38 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Ct. Cl. 1942). The court
denied recovery, however, on the ground that there was a qualified privilege and
no malice. The report was published in a newspaper.
157. 5 N.Y.2d 585, 159 N.E.2d 166 (1959). Both the lower courts bad also denied
an absolute privilege to the speech, 5 App. Div. 2d 448, 172 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1958),
modifying and affirming 6 Misc. 2d 988, 167 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1957). The court
of appeals decision was rendered not long before the supreme court's decision in the
Barr case. I believe that a majority of the court also denied a qualified privilege based
on the defendant's official status, but I confess I am not sure.
158. Again, it is interesting to contrast Steinberg v. O'Connor, note 110 supra, decided
by the federal district court in Connecticut after the Barr case.
159. Goodyear Aluminum Prods., Inc. v. New York, 21 Misc. 2d 725, 203 N.Y.S.2d
256 (Ct. Cl. 1960). Newspaper publication was alleged.
160. 12 App. Div. 2d 692, 207 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1960). The decision may be sound
enough but if it should be coupled with a rule giving the state the benefit of the
official's absolute privilege when he is in the line of duty, it would prevent the state
from being liable at all. The court of claims has given the state the benefit of an
official's qualified privilege. See Peeples v. State, supra note 156. The bearing of
Manceri v. City of New York, 12 App. Div. 2d 895, 209 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1961) on this
question is not clear. The defendants in the case were the city and an assistant district
attorney, who slandered the plaintiff after his arrest. The court gave the individual
defendant the benefit of the judicial privilege probably (though it also cited the
Cheatum case) but seems to have thought that the city might still be liable.
161. Rausch v. Anderson, 75 Ill. App. 526 (1898). The defendant only claimed
the judicial privilege though the executive privilege would have been more appropriate.
The court did not think it essential to decide whether the defendant acted "in a judicial or ministerial capacity." Id. at 535. Of absolute privilege in general it said:
"Courts generally are not inclined to extend the doctrine of absolutely privileged communications ... nor are we." Id. at 536. It allowed a qualified privilege and remanded
the case for trial on the issue of malice.
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board committee. 162 There were also dicta on absolute privilege in a subse163
quent case, in which the defendant pleaded only qualified privilege.
Then, in Donner v. Francis,164 the privilege was firmly declared and given
a broad scope. A civil service employee in a United States hospital sued
his superior for various statements to officials of the Veteran's Bureau in
Washington. The court held that:
All communications, either verbal or written, passing between public officials
pertaining to their duties and in the conduct of public business are of necessity absolutely privileged165and such matters cannot be made the basis of
recovery in a suit at law.

In the only subsequent case there was a summary judgment for the mayor
and commissioners of a city in an action for passing a motion temporarily
suspending a city clerk on a charge of malfeasance. 166 The court seems to
have relied on the legislative privilege, but commented on the executive
privilege; and, while it indicated that the class of absolutely privileged communications is small, it does not seem to have intended to
narrow the Donner case. On the whole, the Illinois appellate court seems as
much in favor of the privilege as the Maryland Supreme Court is against it.
Group 3.-The only case raising the issue against the governor of a state
arose in Iowa.167 The Governor had ordered an investigation of a division
of the state department of banking, and received a report which defamed
the plaintiff. Though the Governor's giving the report to the press seems
almost unpremeditated, 1' the court treated it as a deliberate press release.
The next day the officer who signed the report wrote the defendant that
the defamatory statement was an error, the defendant gave copies of this
to the same reporters, and it was as widely published as the original report.
After saying that it made no difference whether the privilege was absolute
or qualified, because the plaintiff had failed to show malice, the court held
162. Haskell v. Perkins, 165 Ill. App. 144 (1911). The opinion also contains a mixture of the testimonial privilege, rests on the judicial privilege more expressly than on
the executive privilege, and states that the plaintiff's offered evidence would not have
shown malice. But one passage of the opinion is very similar to the broad language
quoted from a later case giving the executive privilege at note 165 infra.
163. See Iddings v. Houser, 237 Ill. App. 236 (1925).
164. 255 Ill. App. 409, petition for cert. dismissed, 256 III. App. xxxix (1930). A
demurrer to the complaint was held properly sustained.
165. Id. at 412-13. Very similar language can be found in Haskell v. Perkins, supra
note 162. The decision is probably not weakened for the executive privilege by the
fact that the court in a later passage referred to the capacity in which the defendants
had acted as "quasijudicial." Id. at 413.
166. Larson v. Doner, 3211. App. 2d 471, 178 N.E.2d 399 (1961).
167. Ryan v. Wilson, 231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941).
168. Reporters walked into the defendant's outer office where one of them got a
copy of the report from his secretary, and the Governor then said that all reporters
should be treated alike.
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that the defendant had an absolute privilege, even in issuing a press release,
because he was acting within the scope of his duty and because the public
interest in the conduct of bank receiverships justified the publication. Some
years later, in an action against a mayor for remarks at a public meeting of
a city council, the court re-considered the executive privilege, 6 9 though
it may not have been raised, 170 and said that since executive officers act
without the supervision which attends legislative and judicial proceedings,
their absolute privilege must be more closely confined. ("[O]nly top
officers or executives whose acts are of necessity secret or confidential fall
within this immunity." 71 ) The court's reference to "secret or confidential"
as the test of the privilege is a little queer, as it had already sustained a
press release, and its statement that the courts had steadily declined to
expand the executive privilege certainly does no justice to the cases in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, it seems
improbable that the privilege will be widely extended in Iowa.
In Pennsylvania the first case allowed an absolute executive privilege to
a cabinet officer. In Matson v. Margiotti, 72 the defendant, the attorneygeneral of the state, wrote a letter about the plaintiff, an assistant district
attorney, to her superior, demanding her dismissal for communist sympathies and activities, and released the letter to newspapers before it was
delivered. The plaintiff conceded that the attorney-general had an absolute privilege, but argued that he had not acted in the line of duty. With
two judges dissenting, the court held that the defendant had an absolute
privilege both to send the letter and to issue the press release. Referring
with distaste to defamation by public officials, and to the press release as "a
regrettable practice," 7 3 the court nevertheless held that the public interest
justified the attorney general's publication. The privilege was extended
much further in Montgomery v. Philadelphia,74 in which a deputy commissioner of public property and a city architect, in a newspaper interview,
defamed the work of a contractor. The plaintiff conceded that the defendants' duties included telling the public about "the progress of city works" 75
through the press, and the court held that the defendants had "policymaking functions," 76 and was entitled to an absolute privilege. A recent
case denies the privilege to a city councilman for a letter to the mayor
169. Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954).
170. The defendant may have claimed only the legislative and judicial privileges.
The court allowed only a qualified privilege, and it seems that there was to be a trial
on the issue of malice.
171. 245 Iowa at 588, 63 N.W.2d at 225.
172. 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952). See Comment, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 677
(1953) which examines the authorities carefully and is very critical of this decision.
173. 371 Pa. at 203, 88 A.2d at 900.
174. 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958).
175. Id. at 187, 140 A.2d at 105.
176. Ibid.
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denouncing the chairman of a committee of a city department, but as it
first appeared through Republican party headquarters, it was nearly impossible to hold it an official publication, and the case suggests no weakening
77
of previous decisions.
In New Mexico a single decision grants the privilege, on a ground that
requires it to be grouped with the cases against officials of cabinet rank.
At an open meeting of the state highway commission, with the press present,
the defendant, a member of the commission, displayed what he said was a
sample of the plaintiffs work, and made various defamatory statements
about the plaintiff, a highway contractor. The court held that the commissioners had rank in the state government corresponding to cabinet rank
in the federal government, 17 8 and that the defendant had an absolute privilege although the matter was not on the agenda of the meeting. In holding
that the presence of reporters made no difference the court relied upon the
Matson case.
In California the development was originally influenced by a statute, but
a recent case indicates that the common law will probably be the founda79
tion of the rule in the future. In Hale Co. v. Lea,1
the court quoted the
California statute as follows:
A privileged communication is one made1. In the proper discharge of an official duty.
2. In any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding authorized by law.180
The court said that the privilege under the quoted section was absolute,
but denied it to the director of a state laboratory for a letter to the department of agriculture in another state accusing the plaintiff of shipping adulterated products. 181 The defendant's duties were said to be only scientific.
A later case denied the privilege to a clerk in the United States Engineer
office for a letter to the Secretary of War denouncing his superior, because
it did not appear from the pleadings that the letter was intended as a step
in a proceeding. 182 Both cases, I think, should be read as holding that the
defendant had not brought himself within the statute, and not as denying
177. Biggans v. Foglietta, 403 Pa. 510, 170 A.2d 345 (1961). The court said that
the defendant might have a conditional privilege. A judgment sustaining his preliminary
objections was reversed.
178. Adams v. Tatsch, 68 N.M. 446, 362 P.2d 984 (1961) (affirming a judgment
sustaining a motion to dismiss the complaint and denying leave to amend).
179. 191 Cal. 202, 215 Pac. 900 (1923).
180. Id. at 204, 215 Pac. at 901.
181. The action as far as I can tell was for libel and not for disparagement.
182. Layne v. Kirby, 208 Cal. 694, 284 Pac. 441 (1930), reversing 278 Pac. 1046
(Cal. App. 1929). The opinion leaves open the possibility that the privilege would
be given if the defendant could show that the letter began a proceeding.
Numerous cases have been decided under the statute; these and the next are the
only ones I have found that could fairly be treated as cases against executive officials.
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its application to lower officials generally. The latest case, however, may
change this conclusion. In Saroyan v. Burkett,183 the state superintendent
of banks announced in a press release that he was suing to establish the
ownership of certain bonds; the plaintiff, who had been attorney for the
defendant and his predecessor, told the press that the bonds were worthless
and belonged to the federal government anyway. The defendant's reply,
through the press, defamed the plaintiff. There were only immaterial
changes in the statute. The court, applying only the clause giving a privilege "in the proper discharge of an official duty," observed that the absolute
executive privilege was unknown when the statute was originally enacted,
and that its meaning should be considered in the light of that fact. It then
held that the defendant could have the privilege because his rank in the
state government corresponded to cabinet rank in the federal government.
It seems that it would be difficult to limit the privilege given by the statute
to officers of high rank, but the court, especially as it said the statute was
intended as a codification of the common law, may well have this in mind.
There remains one state, Ohio, in which there is a case against persons
appointed by the Governor, and based upon a unique fact situation, which
has led me to include it here. In Bigelow v. Brumley184 the plaintiff was so
closely associated with some proposed amendments to the Ohio constitution
that they were popularly called by his name. Acting under the initiative
law, the Governor appointed three men to frame arguments against the
amendments; and these, with arguments on the other side, were published
under the law by the secretary of state. The arguments against the amendments stated that the plaintiff was a "paid lobbyist for the Single Tax Movement."185 The plaintiff joined the three appointees of the Governor with
nine others in an action for conspiracy to libel him. The court concluded
that the language was not defamatory, but it also held that the three appointees had an absolute privilege, though the others did not. The court
believed that the situation was analogous enough to the executive privilege
to be sustained on that ground, though perhaps the case rests even more on
the legislative privilege. 186
183. 371 P.2d 293 (Cal. 1962).
184. 138 Ohio 574, 37 N.E.2d 584 (1941).
185. Id. at 575, 37 N.E.2d at 587.
186. The court pointed out that the wide circulation of the arguments would give
the fear of liability more weight than usual, and it adverted to the inconvenience of
having litigation on such questions pending during an election. It concluded that
the reasons for all absolute privileges, and especially the executive and legislative,
would support giving the privilege in this case.

The court also had some trouble with the relevance requirement, caused in part by
an earlier case of its own. It observed that this requirement applies to the executive
and judicial privileges, but usually not to the legislative, and concluded that it
should apply to the privilege under the initiative law. The court of appeals had held
the statement about the plaintiff irrelevant, relying on Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio 89,
67 N.E. 152 (1903). in this case a town board of health adopted a resolution with
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This review of the state decisions leads only to the unsatisfactory and

unenlightening conclusion that there is no consensus at all. Cases against
officials of cabinet rank and cases on press publication are very rare. Of the
cases as a whole one can say only that in Maryland the privilege has little
chance, while in Pennsylvania it has a very good one, and also in Illinois if
the case does not get beyond the Illinois appellate courts. Perhaps it is useful to know, as I think the review shows, that it is very dangerous to classify
any of the other states as flatly for or against the privilege. This division of
views, which grew up while the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia was expanding the privilege, suggests, however, that the grounds for it
are not self-evident, and are not even as persuasive as the courts of the
federal system have assumed they are, a reflection which will be useful in
any attempt to assess the wisdom of the rule.

IV.

COMMENTARY

I think this history and summary of the case law reveal a strange condition. In England the growth of the doctrine has been confused; in the
American federal courts it has been clear and firm; the American state
courts, which are not arranged in a hierarchy, have divided, except for
cases against officials of cabinet rank. One examining this result must
admit that the reasons on both sides are likely to be potent, but this may
not be the only cause of the division. Another, I think, is the frustrating
inconclusiveness of many of the arguments which one is tempted to use
when he considers the question. Mr. Gray has suggested that the courts feel
guilty because judicial and legislative officials have immunity. 187 I suspect
a preamble reciting that doctors had caused deaths by handling childbirth cases too
soon after taking care of infectious disorders; the resolution required a thirty day
lapse between the care of such diseases and of childbirths. The plaintiff, a doctor,
sued for libel, claiming that he was meant in the preamble. The defendants seem to
have conceded that they were responsible for newspaper publication. The court
held that the preamble was irrelevant and denied it any privilege, without distinguishing absolute and qualified privileges. I think it had only a qualified privilege in mind.
The supreme court, in the Bigelow case, held that whether the Mauk case stated a
stricter rule for relevance than usual would make no difference, as the statement about
the plaintiff was relevant even under that rule.
I should add that in the Bigelow case, the only defendant contesting the case actively
was one of the nine parties not appointed by the Governor. The trial court had dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and the court of appeals had held that
it stated a cause of action against all, since there was no absolute privilege for the
statement which it had found irrelevant. The supreme court held that although the
contesting defendant had no absolute privilege, the plaintiff could not recover because
the words were not defamatory without special damages and sufficient special damages
had not been alleged. Accordingly, it reversed the court of appeals, but affirmed the
judgment of the trial court only as against the contesting defendant. I believe that in
spite of all this, the case is authority for giving the absolute privilege to the three
defendants appointed by the Governor.
187. Gray, supra note 2, at 340.
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that he is right and would add that the appetite for symmetry is appeased
by a doctrine that gives to each of the three great branches of government
its equal (and absolute) privilege. But these are hardly strong reasons for
overruling the cases that establish the privilege. Again, I am personally
impressed by the number of plaintiffs, over the years, who have risked the
hardships and expense of defamation suits in the federal courts, where the
privilege was strongest. One could infer from this a more than ordinary
opposition to the rule. But he could not be sure. Perhaps some plaintiffs
sue (who would not otherwise dare) because they know that the privilege
will keep the case from trial, leaving them free to say that they fought as
long as they could and lost only because of an unjust rule that prevented
trial on the merits. Such a claim might have some effect in rehabilitating
a character damaged by executive charges.
The Barr and Howard cases have changed the situation. They are the
most formidable authorities that the privilege has ever had behind it. The
man would be braver than I who undertook to say what the state courts
will do with them, but there is always a chance that they will find the
Supreme Court more persuasive than the earlier authorities. And, in our
lower federal courts we have already two ominous cases, one protecting a
speech, 18 and the other a press conference by an assistant attorney general. 189 Both of these, in my opinion, go well beyond the Supreme Court
cases. In speeches and press conferences the speaker is tempted to fit the
role of star performer, and even if he can resist temptation when it comes
from within, he is apt to be led back into it by his audience. Moreover,
such occasions lack the formality and dignity that should accompany an
activity so important that it excuses malice. For these reasons, it seems
that further consideration of the privilege is warranted.
A.

ATr'UDES AND PROPOSED SOLUrIONS

It seems to be generally agreed that state liability is the best solution of
the problem. 90 But it depends upon legislative action, and the reluctance
of Anglo-American jurisdictions to waive the sovereign immunity is notorious. This solution is a distant one, and the problem is what to do in the
interval.
The Restatement of Torts gives an absolute privilege to federal and state
officers of cabinet rank, and a qualified privilege to lower officers, but
caveats the question whether lower officers can ever have an absolute
privilege. 191 It points out that the testimonial privilege may sometimes
188. See note 110 supra.
189. See note 109 supra.
190. E.g., Davis, supra note 2, at 232-34; Gray, supra note 2, at 34748; Handler &
Klein, supra note 2, at 76-79; and see Justice Brennan dissenting in the Barr case, 360
U.S. at 591 (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.).

191.

RFSTATEmENT, TORTS

§ 591 (1938).
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protect lower officials, but does not undertake to define it.192 This, in effect,
adopts the Spalding case and caveats the De Arnaud case and its followers.
Professor Davis' position, in a recent article, is hard to determine exactly;
he seems to believe that above a certain level an absolute privilege should
be given, while below it, affidavits and motions for summary judgment
might be used to single out the defendants who had acted maliciously;
"such a solution may be desirable especially when the functions performed
involve a larger proportion of the ministerial and a lesser proportion of the
so-called discretionary." 193 Mr. Gray, in an article written somewhat later,
is hostile to the privilege and would not give it, I believe, even to officials
of cabinet rank.194 As both writers deal with official liability for tort
generally, those who wish to place the defamation privilege in perspective
by comparing it with the privilege for other torts, will find their articles
helpful-the more so as they differ quite widely on the questions of what
the law is and what it ought to be. While the perspective is useful, I doubt
that the same rule, in the end, ought to be applied to all of the torts. 195 An
official's privilege in speaking ought not necessarily to be the same, for
example, as his privilege to order prosecution or arrest. Professor Davis,
indeed, has pointed out reasons why restraints upon higher officials (by
imposing liability on government entities and thus on their budgets) would
more effectually prevent false arrest than the rule that holds individual
policemen. 195 But it is usually assumed that it is easier to justify giving the
defamation privilege to a higher official than to a lower one. I think there
are sound reasons to distinguish malicious prosecution also. A lower official,
in the great majority of cases, must decide whether to prosecute. The tort
is not one that higher officials are likely to commit often-not even an attorney general. And it would be senseless to protect an attorney general in
the few cases he might be made responsible for, while denying protection
to the host of district attorneys and their assistants who actually carry on
the work, making precisely the same decisions by precisely the same means.
Both in function and in context these torts seem so different to me, that it
would not be surprising if the best answer to the privilege question were
different for each of them.
Since the Barr and Howard cases, Professors Handler and Klein have
published an article 97 suggesting a solution different from any other so
far proposed. Their article should be read in its entirety, as I can give
only a brief description of it. They would confine the absolute executive
192. Id. comment b.
193. Davis, supra note 2, at 233-34. See also id. at 218-22.
194. Gray, supra note 2, at 347-49 for his conclusions.
195. Though it must be remembered that Justice Harlan's opinion in the Barr case
states the interests to be balanced in language broad enough to cover other torts. 360
U.S. at 564-65. See the text accompanying note 96 supra.
196. Davis, supra note 2, at 216-17.
197. Handler & Klein, supra note 2.
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privilege to executive proceedings, such as some proceedings for discharge,
having the safeguards and restraints that justify the privilege for judicial
proceedings. They would extend the absolute privilege to publications of
the charges filed and the decisions rendered in such proceedings. This
confines the absolute privilege very narrowly. For official statements not
within this class, they, suggest that officials should not be limited to a
qualified privilege, defeasible by malice or excessive publication, but propose, instead, a "due care privilege," which would protect an official
whenever a reasonable man could have believed the statement true, whether
or not the official actually believed it. This, by transferring the issue from
(subjective) motive to (objective) reasonable grounds for belief, would
permit more cases to be decided on motion or directed verdict, and would
produce more verdicts for the defendants; all this, they believe though
they are not sure, would disturb officials less than the prospect of jury trials
on qualified privilege and malice.
Their analysis of the relevance of the judicial privilege to the executive
is the best treatment of this question that I have seen. I suggest, tentatively,
that it might be better to classify the executive proceedings of a judicial
type under an extension of the judicial privilege rather than under executive
privilege, thus keeping constantly before the courts the fact that it is judicial
safeguards they must emphasize in deciding whether to give the privilege.
The suggestion that officials denied an absolute privilege should be liable
for lack of due care, but not for malice, is an original one. Anyone who
does not like the absolute privilege (and I do not) is bound to prefer this
solution to the federal cases. It is quite possible, moreover, that a court
which is unwilling to subject an official to a qualified privilege could be
persuaded to impose the risk of a trial, in substance, on the issue of due
care, i.e., the proposal might help to break down the absolute privilege by
offering a more palatable alternative than the qualified privilege. I am, on
the whole, however, more interested in defeating the absolute privilege
than in providing officials with a special rule, and am not sure that it is just
to enable them to avoid trial on the issue of malice.
B.

EVALUATION OF THE GROUNDS OF THE PRIVILEGE

If the qualified privilege were adopted for officials, these consequences
might follow: (1) some officials may lose time from their duties to prepare
for and attend trial; (2) some guilty officers may have to pay damages,
and also some innocent ones; (3) some officials may, in consequence of
their fearing (1) and (2), withhold information from other officials, that
is, internal reports may be suppressed in whole or in part and the free flow
of information within the government may suffer; (4) some officials for the
same reason may withhold information from (large or small segments of)
the public.
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I think the first of these consequences can be dismissed as unworthy of
serious consideration. Officials would have to give an accounting of the
ways in which they spend their time before anyone could pass an intelligent
judgment on the question of whether this is a significant factor. Ordinarily
people frequently take care of their legal problems at night or during other
off hours, and no reason occurs to me why officials should not do the same
if it is necessary. Moreover, a good deal of protection against this sort of
loss is probably given already by the testimonial privilege. But, finally, if
a system of state liability were introduced, and if the official were reduced
to a qualified privilege, I presume the state would have the benefit of that
privilege, which would mean that the official would have to prepare for
and attend trial on the issue of malice in an action against the state. The
argument, in short, if it is sound at all, applies to state liability as much as
to individual liability. This is perhaps the chief reason why it should not
be taken seriously.
As for the second consequence, the risk of personal liability, the advocates of the privilege have often said that they do not wish to protect the
guilty official, and that the effect on all officials and the resulting interference with internal and external communications, the third and fourth
consequences, are its justification. That is, they deny that this consequence,
taken in isolation, is a reason for the privilege. Though it is giving aid to
the opposition, I think that the protection of the official is a factor of some
weight in favor of the privilege. If a lower official has a prescribed duty
to report or if he knows that he is expected to, his position with a qualified
privilege is unpleasant. If he puts the charge in he may have to stand a
trial on malice, and if he leaves it out he may be thought later to have been
careless, unco-operative, or corrupt. The resulting temptation to give an
absolute privilege for internal reports has sometimes been bolstered by the
argument that they do not do much harm, as superior officials will recognize
and discount malice. 198 I almost wish I could believe this, but I seriously
doubt it. Superior officers are not, I fear, endowed with unusual capacities
to distinguish true motives from false. Again, I suspect that various departments of the government share their internal reports and indeed, would be
criticized if they did not; such a report may be seen by men who never
heard of its author, and may be used for purposes that he never guessed.
Originating without harm in one department, it may turn up causing great
damage years later in some other. On the whole, the lower official's predicament, considered alone, is not in my opinion a sufficient ground for giving
more than a qualified privilege. As one rises higher in the official scale, the
occasions on which reports are obligatory and require anything as specific
as personal defamation, are likely to be fewer. An internal revenue agent
198. "It may not be unreasonable to assume that if a maliciously false libel is uttered
in an internal report, it will be recognized as such and discredited without further dissemination." 360 U.S. at 582 (dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.).
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or a field investigator for a department will have many more occasions for
defaming people than the Secretary of the Treasury or of the Interior. Even
making allowances for the greater importance of the occasions on which a
high official will speak, if the privilege cannot be justified on this ground
for the lower official, surely it cannot be justified for the higher. And if
one turns from internal reports to publications to larger audiences, I think
the balance remains the same or falls more heavily in favor of the plaintiff,
for (a) his harm is greater and more certain, while (b) the need for wide
publication is probably less than the need for day-to-day communication
within the government.
This brings us to the last two consequences, the risk of stifling internal
and external communications by officials. The argument about these rages
over an immense and ill-defined territory. I confine this part of the discussion to one argument, leaving the rest to the next subsection. The strongest
argument for the privilege is that the second consequence, the fear of liability, will produce the third and fourth. How do we know that this is true?
Professors Handler and Klein, while they deny any intention to say that
judges should not rely "on speculations based on common sense and their
own experience," or that "it would be possible to assemble useful empirical
data as to the effect of various possible rules of privilege" have pointed out,
in annotating a statement from Justice Brennan's dissent in the Barr case,
that the nexus is unproved and that there is no showing that states whose
courts have adopted a qualified privilege rule have suffered. 199 The courts,
I would add, by extending the absolute privilege, have prevented us from
finding out how sound the nexus is. If Secretary Mellon and Secretary
Ickes had had to stand trials on malice, the Government, might, in time,
have been able to show precisely what communications had been stifled in
consequence and on what occasions. This would have given us better
matter to think about than the mere assertion of the nexus itself. But, I
think, there are positive reasons for doubting that the connection between
fear and the withholding of information would have any calculable effect.
The argument for the privilege has derived a good deal of emotional
strength from the idealistic concept of the "fearless official." Practically
speaking, I doubt that there is such a thing. Whether there ought to be
is another question, discussed in the next subsection. Amongst the constellation of pressures that act on official minds, the risk of lawsuits perhaps is
199. Handler & Klein, supra note 2, at 50-51 & n.24.
Justice Brennan, after referring to the nexus, said be feared it "is a gossamer web
self-spun without a scintilla of support to which one can point." 360 U.S. at 590.
Handler and Klein suggest "that the courts, at least in this area, should treat their
speculations a good deal more circumspectly than they have thus far. The attitude of
the courts toward the proposition that absolute privilege is essential to executive free-

dom of action seems to manifest an unfortunate tendency to be mesmerized by resounding phrases and to ignore the fallibility of a priori notions about psychological
phenomena." Handler &Klein, supra note 2, at 50 n.24.
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one, but which of these rises to the level of a "fear" and what effect it has
if it does-all this, I think, would baffle a psychoanalyst to determine. The
whole contention, when closely examined, is unpersuasive.
C.

FREEDOM, FREE GOvERNENT, FIm

COMMUNICATION

The concept of freedom standing alone or in combination with other concepts has played an important part in the history of the privilege. We have
seen that Baron Eyre, in 1786, thought the absolute privilege inconsistent
with a free government. This immediate appeal to a general concept may
be old-fashioned, but it can easily enough be put into a newer mould. Let
us say that it is a positive evil for a citizen in a democracy to have his reputation ruined by malicious official defamation without a chance to try the
merits of his case in a court. Even if we add that the evil is great enough
and obvious enough to demand a strong justification, I doubt that many
people would disagree. All of this seems clearer than the connection between the fear of lawsuits and the stifling of communication by officials,
but it is more important to notice that our attachment to a democratic
form of government, in which men are individuals and not merely functional
parts in a state apparatus, commits us to this judgment.
Mr. Justice Black, concurring in the Barr case, said:
The effective functioning of a free government like ours depends largely on
the force of an informed public opinion. This calls for the widest possible
understanding of the quality of government service rendered by all elective
or appointed public officials or employees. Such an informed understanding
depends, of course, on the freedom people have to applaud or to criticize the
way public employees do their jobs, from the least to the most important.200
It would be possible to argue that Mr. justice Black meant to put the
privilege on the ground that the communication was about an official, not
by one, but I do not believe that this is what he meant. At any rate, this
is his justification for giving the privilege to an official. A similar but
broader position has been taken by Professor Green. After commenting
upon the wide demand for public communications from officials, in interviews, press releases, speeches, and in other ways, he says:
The official may wholly pervert the freedom given to him but whatever he
may say or write, so long as it is even marginally connected with the performance of his official function, subjects him to no liability for the injuries
he may inflict on other people by his errors, falsehoods or downright maliciousness. Except for some jurisdictions in which minor officials may still
be held liable for malicious statements if the victim can successfully prove
201
their malicious quality, the immunity of officials is complete.
200. 360 U.S. at 577.
201. Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U.L. RPv. 903, at 908 (1960).
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The underlying reason for this, he says, is the common interest in having
fearless officials, and admitting that the price is high, he says that we pay
it "not for the scoundrel's sake, but to protect our common right of communication." 02 These may be taken as attempts to sustain the burden of
justifying the privilege against its obvious evil effects. Mr. Justice Black's
words, moreover, call attention to the fact that the official's critical statements (those most likely to be defamatory) are particularly needed. Both
arguments depend upon the nexus between fear of liability and restraint
upon official freedom, which was criticized in the last subsection, and are,
on the merits, no stronger than that nexus is. The condition of the argument
now, however, is a little queer, for Baron Eyre's contention that the
privilege is inconsistent with a free government has been answered by a
contention that free government demands the privilege.
Chief Justice Warren's dissent in the Barr case supplies the next part in
the dialogue. He argued that besides the public interest in receiving information from officials there is an interest in free criticism of official conduct,
which will be inhibited by rules giving an absolute privilege to the official
and only a qualified one to the non-official critic.20 3 This argument, of
course, depends upon another nexus: the citizen, aware of the rules or
made aware of them by his lawyer, may refrain from criticizing officials
because of his fear that they will abuse their absolute privileges in their
replies. This nexus, it seems to me, is neither better nor worse than the
other in the present state of our knowledge (or ignorance). We do not
know, in short, whether or how much the fear of liability restrains an official,
or the fear of absolutely privileged response restrains a critically minded
citizen. Granted this, which alternative is the worse-should we be more
careful to protect the official or the non-official critic? I find the answer to
that question easy, for it seems clear to me that a free government, as distinguished from a totalitarian one, ought to be more afraid of silencing its
citizens than of silencing its officials.
A form of government necessarily stresses some qualities which its theory
approves and neglects or inhibits others which its theory teaches are unsound or dangerous. But the disapproved qualities are not usually entirely
evil, and they tend to attract public sympathy. Consequently, a form of
government often generates some of the qualities of its antithesis. Democratic leanings powerful enough to demand careful handling develop under
dictators, while in democracies some of the qualities of dictatorship are
likely to appear. It seems to me that the "fearless official" is one of those
incidental developments in the United States. The truth is, we do not, in
the present state of man and government, want anybody to be fearless.
Citizens and officials alike ought to be afraid of some things, including
202. Id. at 909.
203. 360 U.S. at 584-85.
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convictions for crimes and the risk of civil liability if they wrong anybody.
The absolute privilege protects an official from fear of the consequences of
his malice, but it seems to me that this is one of the fears we should want
him to have. Certainly it is not as dangerous to the public interest as many
other fears that we cannot spare him. And the fact that similar privileges
are given to the legislature and to participants in judicial proceedings does
not, as far as I can see, support the claim for giving it to the executive.
Legislators and judges are few in number, while the other beneficiaries of
the judicial privilege-lawyers and witnesses-can make no organized use
of the occasions on which they enjoy the privilege. The executive, on the
other hand, is more numerous than the legislators and judges,204 and more
organized with far more power to take action. It is in the image of dictatorship if anything is, and its most probable source if it ever arises among us.
The public need for free communication from officials has also, I think,
been overstated by Professor Green. 205 Communicating, we should remember, is now a business, and like any business that is not inherently seasonal,
it needs a constant supply of raw material and a constant demand for its
product. It is also in an admirable position to exaggerate the benefits it
confers on the rest of us. Much of its output, I fear, is not so much to
supply our need as its own. The overstatement can have evil effects on
the law, and if the public believes too much in it, that is the more reason
why the courts should not, for they still exist in part to give us what is
good for us and not merely what we want. All this is not, of course, a reason
to restrict the freedom of the press, but it is a reason for examining how
much privilege should be given to official malice.
In conclusion on this point, the common good, of course, is the basis of
the claim for the privilege. I am incorrigibly suspicious of collective good
which is achieved by putting losses on individuals as luck-or malice-have
it. There is a remote but telling analogy in another field of tort law. The
collective good was once considered an argument against workmen's compensation laws. Though it is disgusting to define the public good as the
greatest quantity of consumer's goods at the lowest price, I presume that
in economics this is a criterion. How do we know what the condition of
the public good, thus defined, would have been if we had left workmen
to their actions of negligence and subject to all the old defenses? Those
of us who were not hurt might have more goods now, at cheaper prices.
I doubt whether anybody knows this, or knows whether the distribution
of money and improvement of productivity resulting from the laws has
compensated the loss, if any, indirectly. But I think the fact is, we don't
care. We willingly pay the unknown price in order to prevent human
204. Justice Brennan made this point in his dissent in the Barr case, 360 U.S. at
587 n. 4 (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.).
205. Green, supra note 201, at 908-09. I think my comments apply to the other
communications discussed in this article also.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL,. 15

suffering. The same point, I think, might be made against the contentions
that the public would lose in the efficiency of its officials and suffer from
the lack of information if officials were reduced to a qualified privilege.
In the actions of workmen against their employers the courts gave us a
protection that we finally decided we did not want, and have found since
that we do not need. The absolute privilege rule has, I submit, had the
same effect in the field of executive defamation.
D. RlEDIES
These may stand as my reasons for preferring to reduce officials to a
qualified privilege in defamation, and this is the solution that would, in the
long run, I think, be best. A less drastic step would be to reduce them,
except in absolutely privileged proceedings of a judicial type, to a "due
care privilege," as proposed by Professors Handler and Klein. I would, on
the whole, prefer the qualified privilege, however, as I am not convinced
that officials ought to have any better protection than others-not even the
relaxation which they propose.
It is natural to think of legislative action abolishing the rule as a
remedy, especially as one could hope for support from civil liberties organizations. But one of the more discouraging factors in the situation is that
proposals for legislative reform of this kind would, I fear, be futile, and
perhaps dangerous. The beneficiaries of the absolute privilege rule are
organized officials, many of them concentrated in the Capitol. Its future
victims cannot even identify themselves. Under the circumstances, any
attempt to secure redress in Congress might well end in a statute extending
the rule.
It might be safer to propose legislation giving a person who claims that
he has been defamed by an official an action for a declaratory judgment to
determine whether the charges were (a) false and (b) malicious. 2 6 Since
the plaintiff could not secure any compensation in such an action, it would
be just to provide that his expenses, including counsel fees, should be paid
out of the federal treasury if he succeeds on the first issue or on both. This
remedy would relieve the official of the fear of monetary liability, and if
his charges were false and not malicious, he could scarcely complain of
the plaintiff's vindication. In fact, he ought to assist in it. If he acted
maliciously, a declaration by a court that he did seems to me no more
than an appropriate punishment.
A more general plan has been proposed, perhaps is now adopted, in
New Zealand, modelled upon Scandinavian practice. The proposal provides
for a public defender who, for a small fee, will investigate the complaints
206. This remedy is like the Arkansas "lie bill" described in Leflar, Legal Remedies
for Defamation, 6 Ax. L. REv. 423 (1952). See also the discussion of other remedies
in this article.
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of citizens against government departments. He would have power to
examine official files, and to make recommendations to department heads,
with ultimate appeal to the Prime Minister and to Parliament.207 I am
acquainted with this plan only through a newspaper account, and do not
know the details, particularly what kinds of relief a complainant can
secure under it. Judging from the number of tort suits against officials in
this country, there is need for such a remedy, and, even if state liability
should finally be adopted, it would remain a valuable adjunct for minor
wrongs.
In conclusion, I would agree with others who believe that state liability
would be the best, and perhaps the only satisfactory solution, for it would
relieve officials of any fear that they feel, and would at the same time compensate and vindicate the injured plaintiff. In the interim, however hopeless
the cause may seem, the reasons for the absolute privilege are too precarious
to justify the palpable wrongs it permits. If the qualified privilege should
result in the withholding of some information from officials or from the
public, I doubt that the risk of injury to the common good would be
serious, and if it were, it would add one more argument to those which
already exist for putting the liability upon the state.
207. See the N.Y. Times Aug. 12, 1962, § 1, p. 3.

